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KILL CAMMER: SECURITIES LITIGATION
WITHOUT JUNK SCIENCE
J.B. HEATON*
ABSTRACT
Securities litigation is a hotbed of junk science concerning
market efficiency. This Article explains why and suggests a way
out. In its 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court
endorsed the fraud on the market presumption for securities
traded in an efficient market. Faced with the task of determining
market efficiency, courts throughout the nation embraced the ad
hoc speculations of a first-mover district court that proclaimed,
in Cammer v. Bloom, how to allege (and presumably prove) facts
that would do just that. The Cammer court’s analysis did not
rely on financial economics for its notions, but instead regurgitated the assertions of a single plaintiff’s expert affidavit—from a
securities law professor, not a financial economist—and a securities law treatise equally uninformed by the relevant field. The
result has been thirty years of junk science in securities adjudication. This Article traces the development of the fraud on the market theory from its pre-efficient-markets-hypothesis roots through
a brief “gilding the lily” phase where an appeal to social science
results on market efficiency was only an ancillary, bolstering
argument for already-sufficient precedent for the fraud on the market presumption, to the requirement that litigants plead and
prove efficiency using indicia with no support in financial economics. The way out of this embarrassing state of affairs is to
return to the roots of fraud on the market in the non-technical
notion of “a free and open public market” that inquires only
whether the market for the security at issue is open to active buyers and sellers and is not subject to substantial seller lockups or

J.B. Heaton, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, jb@jbheaton.com. For very helpful
comments and suggestions on a preliminary draft, I am grateful to Jacquelyn
Bouwman, Alon Brav, Brad Cornell, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Marc Gross,
Davidson Heath, Ashley Keller, Tom Miles, and Eric Posner.
*
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bans on short selling. It is reasonable to presume that prices in
such free and open public markets can be distorted by fraud, a
presumption that is then rebuttable by establishing (1) that the
alleged fraud in fact had no price impact; (2) that there are substantial limits on the ability of active investors to buy and sell in
the market, such that the market is not a “free and open public” one;
or (3) that the plaintiff would have made their purchase or sale at
the affected price even knowing of the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. This formulation is consistent with all controlling
Supreme Court opinions.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal securities litigation1 is a hotbed of junk science
about market efficiency. It was not always so. It need not be the
case going forward.
Securities litigation’s fraud on the market presumption
“says that all traders who purchase stock in an efficient market
are presumed to have relied on the accuracy of a company’s public statements.”2 Junk science entered securities litigation when
courts applying the fraud on the market presumption embraced
the ad hoc speculations of a federal district court in Cammer v.
Bloom.3 The Cammer court was the first to set out a list of facts
that—it asserted—would indicate an efficient market for the
security at issue.4 Key facts to allege were:
1. large trading volume;5
2. a significant number of reports by securities analysts;6


1 This Article focuses on securities litigation under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018), and the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
2 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 n.6 (2011). Professors
Hu and Morley state the rationale for the presumption well:
This is why federal securities law has developed the so-called
“fraud on the market” doctrine: even if an investor is not aware
of a piece of information, she may nevertheless be said to have
relied on it, because the information will inevitably influence
the price at which an investor can buy or sell.
Henry T. C. Hu & John D. Morley, A Regulatory Framework for ExchangeTraded Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 908 (2018). The fraud on the market theory
has long been criticized by some securities scholars. See generally, e.g., William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market,
160 U. Penn. L. Rev. 69 (2011) (arguing that fraud on the market class actions lack
academic support). However, the fraud on the market theory has generally stood
the test of time. See James Cameron Spindler, We Have a Consensus on Fraud on
the Market—and It’s Wrong, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 67, 69–73 (2017) (evaluating and rejecting critiques). This is likely because there is no other effective
way to provide deterrence against corporate fraud in modern securities markets. Cf. Antonio E. Bernardo et al., A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 26, 39 (2000) (arguing that legal presumptions balance the
social costs of redistributive litigation with the need for deterrence).
3 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 (D.N.J. 1989).
4 Id. at 1286.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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3. the presence of market-makers and arbitrageurs in
the security;7
4. eligibility of the issuer to file an S-3 registration
statement;8 and
5. a history of immediate stock9 price movements in
response to unexpected corporate events and financial releases.10
Since these so-called “Cammer factors” came into play,
another federal district court added three more factors—(1) the
capitalization of the company; (2) the bid-ask spread of the stock;
and (3) the percentage of stock not held by insiders.11 Alas, none
of these factors had—or have today—any support in the vast body
of research on efficient markets as methods of distinguishing
efficient from inefficient prices.12 When they get us to the right


Id. at 1286–87.
Id. at 1287.
9 Much litigation, and much discussion of the fraud on the market presumption, focuses on stocks rather than other securities. The best evidence
strongly suggests, however, that the markets for bonds and options are at
least equally efficient. See, e.g., Michael Hartzmark et al., Fraud on the Market: Analysis of the Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 654, 656 (2011) (analyzing bond market efficiency and criticizing
the decision of the court in In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig. (AIG), 265
F.R.D. 157, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the bond market inefficient for one
of the world’s largest companies)); Edith S. Hotchkiss & Tavy Ronen, The
Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis,
15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1325, 1352 (2002) (finding bonds as efficiently priced as
their same-company stocks).
10 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287.
11 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
12 Financial economists have argued before that at least some of the
Cammer factors are unconnected to financial economic research, but this prior
work has not traced the doctrinal introduction of the factors, examined each
systematically against the financial economic evidence, or proposed that they
should all be abandoned. See Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory and the Indicators of Common Stocks’ Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285,
290 (1994) (“The various market efficiency criteria applied so far by courts are
ad hoc. We know of no systematic body of evidence showing that these or any
other criteria distinguish between efficient and inefficient stocks. Nor are we
aware of evidence supporting specific cutoff values of these criteria.”) I pointed
this out with Alon Brav in Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy,
28 J. CORP. L. 517, 535 (2003) (“The use of efficient markets theory in many
reported cases is inexpert at best, erratic at worst. This inconsistent nature of
7
8
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answer it is usually just because the Cammer factors are proxies
for being a big, publicly traded company and such companies are
almost always traded in an efficient market.13 When they fail, it
is because they give courts too much flexibility to find inefficiency
where it almost surely does not exist.14
The Cammer court lifted its factors willy-nilly from an expert
affidavit of a securities law professor (not a financial economist)


efficient markets evidence in reported cases is perhaps unsurprising since the
‘science’ supporting an ability to distinguish efficient and inefficient markets
for litigation purposes is highly suspect.”). A number of legal commentators
have recognized the lack of connection between the Cammer factors and financial
economics. See also James D. Cox, Fraud on the Market After Amgen, 9 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 (2013):
[T]here is nothing in the EMH holding that investors react
differently in trading publicly traded stocks that are within
the Cammer factors than how they react when trading in publicly traded shares of stocks in smaller capitalization issuers
that do not meet all the Cammer factors.
Allen Ferrell & Andrew Roper, Price Impact, Materiality, and Halliburton II,
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 558 (2015) (“The finance literature does not support
viewing the first four Cammer factors as formulated and applied as constituting
a reliable test for establishing semi-strong form market efficiency as they are
commonly invoked prior to class certification. The fifth Cammer factor (a
cause-and-effect relationship between public news and changes in stock price) can
provide a more reliable indication of market efficiency when properly evaluated. However, courts’ understanding of what constitutes a reliable indication
can vary substantially between cases and between courts.”); Mukesh Bajaj et
al., Assessing Market Efficiency for Reliance on the Fraud-On-The-Market
Doctrine After Wal-Mart and Amgen, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS
ACTIONS 161, 183 (James Langenfeld ed., 2014) (criticizing the Cammer factors); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. L. 671,
675 (2014) (arguing for the elimination of “the current exclusive focus on the
Cammer factors”). One commentator has argued “that the Cammer factors
are profoundly flawed” but asserts without evidence that they “are likely biased to
finding a higher degree of efficiency than actually exists.” Joseph A. Grundfest,
Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 BUS. L.
307, 378 (2014). Professor Grundfest is wrong; the Cammer factors are almost
surely biased against finding efficiency where it exists, a fact best evidenced by
cases finding inefficiency for securities that almost any (disinterested) financial economist would characterize as efficient.
13 See David Tabak, Testing Securities Market Efficiency With Cammer Factors, LAW360 (Feb. 5, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxy.wm.edu
/articles/1125546/testing-securities-market-efficiency-with-cammer-factors
[https://perma.cc/3HZ7-AZ2W].
14 Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common Stocks’ Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 290 (1994).
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submitted by the plaintiff,15 supplemented with citations to the
speculations of two other securities lawyers (one a professor,16
one a practitioner,17 neither a financial economist) in a securities treatise.18 None of these factors were anchored in the social
science of efficient markets research.19 Nevertheless, the Cammer
factors quickly became a mainstay of class-action securities fraud
litigation. The lure of lucrative expert witness testimony led
trained financial economists who surely knew better—and sometimes admitted they did20—to apply them in court. Reported
opinions are filled with painstaking analyses of these factors,21

15 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989) (“While the Amended
Complaint does not contain most of the foregoing types of allegations, the Poser
Affidavit does.”). The expert was Norman Poser, then professor of law at
Brooklyn Law School. Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The “Less Than” Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-theMarket Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 129 n.115 (2004) (citing Aff. of Norman
Poser, Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989)).
16 Alan R. Bromberg was professor of law at Southern Methodist University
School of Law. $2 Million Gift From Wife of Late SMU Professor Alan Bromberg,
SMU (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.smu.edu/News/2015/alan-r-bromberg-gift-18
dec2015 [https://perma.cc/3DUZ-3BG8].
17 Lewis D. Lowenfels practiced securities law in New York City. Lewis D.
Lowenfels Esq. L. OFF. LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, http://www.tolinslowenfels.com
/LDL.html [https://perma.cc/YVR7-V9JK].
18 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286 (citing Bromberg & Lowenfels, 4 Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud, § 8.6 (Aug. 1988)).
19 See infra Section I.B.
20 Willis v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-604, 2017 WL 1074048, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 17, 2017) (“Defendants, through their expert Dr. Paul Gompers
(‘Dr. Gompers’), contest the usefulness of the Cammer factors for determining
market efficiency, asserting that accepted academic literature does not find
the first four Cammer factors relevant to a determination of market efficiency.”);
Ferrell & Roper, supra note 12, at 558 (“Courts have adopted a number of
factors, most prominently the well-known Cammer and Krogman factors, to assess
the efficiency of the market for a security for class certification purposes. These
court-adopted factors can often effectively prevent defendants from successfully
challenging market efficiency for class certification purposes even though these
court-adopted factors have not been shown to provide a reliable test of market
efficiency using commonly accepted econometric methods in the literature.”).
21 Very recent examples including the following: Angley v. UTI Worldwide
Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1120–27 (C.D. Cal. 2018); In re Banc of California
Sec. Litig., 326 F.R.D. 640, 648–50 (C.D. Cal. 2018), leave to appeal denied
sub nom; Garcia v. Banc of California, Inc., No. 18-80068, 2018 WL 4474393
(9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2018); City of Cape Coral Mun. Firefighters’ Ret. Plan v.
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none of which explain anything about the question at hand: was
the market for this security efficient in the sense required by the
fraud on the market presumption?
What is especially strange about this state of affairs—and
also indicative of the way out—is that such detailed inquiry into
the nature of a securities market was unnecessary. The earliest
fraud on the market cases22 did not invoke the efficient markets


Emergent Biosolutions, Inc., HQ, 322 F. Supp. 3d 676, 687–90 (D. Md. 2018);
Wilson v. LSB Indus., Inc., No. 15CIV7614RAGWG, 2018 WL 3913115, at *9–*16
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018); Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 328
F.R.D. 86, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The result of this focus on the Cammer factors
is a large part of litigation for class certification. See Kevin S. Haeberle & M.
Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1313, 1355 (2018):
The result is a kind of dystopian judicial proceeding in which
the plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense lawyers argue their entire
case at a point in the litigation when little is known, focusing
on things like market efficiency, and real issues about the appropriate scope of the litigation to serve its compensation and
deterrence ends are largely ignored.
Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Securities Class Actions, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1521 (2015):
In determining market efficiency, most courts rely on the factors laid out in Cammer: the average weekly trading volume,
the number of analysts following the stock, the number of
market makers and arbitrageurs, the issuing company’s eligibility to file a Form S-3 registration statement, and the causeand-effect relationship between corporate events or financial
releases and the stock price. Courts disagree about whether all
of these factors must be satisfied, which are the most important,
which should be the most heavily weighted, and what the appropriate thresholds are for satisfying each factor.
22 The term “fraud on the market” first appears in a reported case, the
1969 opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), amended, 49
F.R.D. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Andrew C. Baker, Single-Firm Event Studies,
Securities Fraud, and Financial Crisis: Problems of Inference, 68 STAN. L.
REV. 1207, 1216 (2016) (citing Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y 1969);
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975)) (“The FOTM theory
was first adopted by the District Court for the Southern District of New York
in 1969 and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1975.”). The term is
credited to Abe Pomerantz’s firm then known as Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek &
Block, which represented the Herbst plaintiffs. See Marc I. Gross, The Road
Map for Class Certification Post–Halliburton II, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485 (2015)
(“The concept that defendants’ misrepresentations create a ‘fraud on the
market’ (‘FOM’) was first coined nearly fifty years ago by Abe Pomerantz, the
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hypothesis. Courts instead embraced the fraud on the market
presumption on the premise that Congress intended in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide “a means by which investors may recover against market manipulators in federal court.”23
One way to manipulate a market was to make material misrepresentations that would cause some traders—but not necessarily
the plaintiffs—to transact at different prices than they would have
transacted without the material misrepresentation. A manipulator’s
misrepresentations comprised two deceptions: one contained in
the untrue representation and one in the form of the artificial price
the misrepresentation caused.24 Because of the “‘causal nexus’
between the alleged misstatements and an inflated price[,]”25 a
plaintiff was “misled ... as to the fair market value of the stock”26
and protected by securities law unless he would have traded anyway even knowing of the false representation.27 In these cases,


pioneer of shareholder rights litigation, in Herbst v. Able.”) The Herbst decision was especially well-suited to a presumption that investors relied on an
artificially created price because the case involved the conversion of debt into
common stock. The conversion became more attractive at the allegedly inflated
price. Interestingly, the number of Rule 10b-5 class action filings increased
substantially in 1970. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Development of Securities
Law in the United States, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 325, 334 (2009) (presenting evidence on the increase in Rule 10b-5 filings). Whether this can be explained by
the Herbst decision remains for future study.
23 In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Of course,
what exactly Congress intended in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 has long been discussed and contested. See, e.g., Steven Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV.
385, 385 (1990) (analyzing Congressional intent with respect to Section 10(b)).
24 In essence, the early cases recognized what later scholars have recognized as well: that misrepresentations can distort price—or not—whether or
not the markets themselves are perfect in the economists’ sense. See, e.g., Bebchuk
& Ferrell, supra note 12, at 671 (arguing for the unimportance of market
efficiency in determining fraudulent price distortion).
25 In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. at 100.
26 Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1978).
27 Blackie, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975).
Requiring direct proof from each purchaser that he relied on a
particular representation when purchasing would defeat recovery
by those whose reliance was indirect, despite the fact that the
causational chain is broken only if the purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known of the misrepresentation.
We decline to leave such open market purchasers unprotected.
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all that was required was that the market for the security at
issue be “free and open.”28 Appealing to efficient markets theory
for support was gilding the lily. Quickly, however, the supportive
social science that was meant as icing on the cake became all
that mattered.
But here is the cold, hard reality: the Cammer factors and
the three others added later—even the oft-praised fifth Cammer
factor (a history of immediate stock price movements in response to
unexpected corporate events and financial releases)29—cannot
determine whether the market for a security at issue in securities
fraud litigation trades in an efficient market. If tested efficiency
is necessary for use of the fraud on the market presumption—
and it is not clear it should be30—then there is only one test that

The statute and rule are designed to foster an expectation that
securities markets are free from fraud an expectation on which
purchasers should be able to rely.
Id.

Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969).
Courts and commentators often assert that the fifth Cammer factor is
most important or most related to market efficiency. Simpson v. Specialty Retail
Concepts, 823 F. Supp. 353, 355 n.6 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (“The fifth Cammer
factor is perhaps the most important one.”); Bradford Cornell, Market Efficiency and Securities Litigation: Implications of the Appellate Decision in
Thane, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 237, 245 n.22 (2011) (“The fifth Cammer factor,
the reaction of the stock price to unexpected news events, is a direct measure
of efficiency.”); Bradford Cornell & John Haut, How Efficient Is Sufficient:
Applying the Concept of Market Efficiency in Litigation, 74 BUS. L. 417, 421
(2019) (“Only one of the Cammer and Krogman criteria speaks to a direct assessment of efficiency that is amenable to scientific quantification—the speed
with which security prices respond to information, in other words informational efficiency.”) This might be correct if applied as stated, but the analysis
in fact turns on whether price reactions are “statistically significant,” a requirement that renders the examination of price reactions unreliable for
determining efficiency.
30 The case for the unimportance of market efficiency for the policies behind the fraud on the market presumption is set out in Jonathan R. Macey,
Geoffrey P. Miller, Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v.
Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) (“We suggest that the focus of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Basic is misplaced: what determines whether
investors were justified in relying on the integrity of the market price is not
the efficiency of the relevant market but rather whether a misstatement distorted
the price of the affected security.”).
28
29
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has significant probative value and is generally accepted: a security-specific test (potentially made up of several possible subtests)
for actionable (trading-relevant) return predictability in the security.31 It is a test that is consistent with a statement of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit “that market price
responds so quickly to new information that ordinary investors cannot make trading profits on the basis of such information.”32 This is
a test on which most financial economists agree.33
What is not reliable are the tests currently used, the most
deceptive of which is the so-called Cammer “fifth factor”: examining the history of price reactions or non-reactions to news for
statistical significance.34 The errors in the interpretation of this
sort of evidence ought to be the subject of an introductory college
statistics class, but instead these interpretive errors shape the
outcome of multimillion- (and multibillion-) dollar litigation.35
News need not cause a statistically significant price reaction, because statistical significance is simply a measure of the relative
size of the price impact; the actual efficient-market impact may
be smaller than that measure. Conversely, the existence of a
statistically significant price impact does not imply the need for
some observable news event, since efficient prices can move for
reasons that are unobservable. Pretending otherwise is nothing
short of a fraud on the court.36
Perhaps the greatest embarrassment of the junk science
in securities litigation is the mutual complicity of plaintiffs and
defendants in continuing it. Rather than stand firm and challenge
the lack of foundational reliability behind the Cammer factors,
plaintiffs have pursued them with vigor. It was a set of plaintiffs, after all, who first offered the affidavit in support of those
factors.37 Defendants at first cherry picked unmet factors and


See In re Poly Medica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id.
33 Id.
34 Daniel Bettencourt & Steven Feinstein, What a Solar Eclipse Has to Do
with Market Efficiency, LAW 360, 1, 2–3 (Nov. 17, 2017).
35 Id.
36 A note to the courts: if you are judging whether a market is efficient by
looking for statistically significant price reactions, you are doing it wrong.
See, e.g., Hatamian v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14-CV-00226 YGR, 2016
WL 1042502, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2016) (“[L]ack of a statistically significant price increase does not necessarily equate to lack of price impact.”).
37 See Ferrillo et al., supra note 15, at 106.
31
32
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argued that the market was inefficient if not all the factors were
present. Ultimately, however, the defendants and their paid experts
seized on the most nonsensical (and most exploitable) factor—
the Cammer fifth factor—and argued that absence of statistically
significant price moves indicated inefficiency, never admitting
that this interpretation was illogical and intellectually dishonest.38
Since plaintiffs at times benefitted from this factor when statistical
significance was present, a strange equilibrium of agreement to
apply junk science emerged.39
Part I traces the use of the efficient markets hypothesis in
fraud on the market cases from a means of bolstering existing
precedent for the reliability of a “free and open public market[ ]”
to the assumption that efficiency was a necessary prerequisite to
the presumption.40 While the United States Supreme Court in Basic
v. Levinson41 did not state explicitly that efficiency in the sense
the term is used in financial economics was necessary for the
application of the fraud on the market presumption, the implicit
suggestion remained42 and some language in later cases from the
Court is consistent with such a requirement.43 Combined with

See, e.g., Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 477 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
As a lawyer and financial economist, my own domain-specific knowledge
is limited, but one must wonder in what other parts of litigation such an equilibrium has emerged.
40 See infra Part I.
41 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
42 This view is summed up well by In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
773 F. Supp. 342, 356 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
While the Supreme Court in Basic did not explicitly approve the
Sixth Circuit’s requirement that ‘a plaintiff must allege and
prove ... that the shares were traded on an efficient market,’ ...
courts have interpreted the Court’s discussion of the lower court
opinion as implicitly approving of this requirement. See, e.g.,
Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197–98 (6th
Cir. 1990); Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776,
781 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.Supp. 1264, 1285
n.34 (D.N.J. 1989); Stinson v. Van Valley Development Corp.,
714 F. Supp. 132, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff’d, 897 F.2d 524 (3d
Cir. 1990).
Id. at 356 n.18 (citations omitted).
43 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 811
(2011) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 484 U.S. 224 (1988)) (“It is undisputed
that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to invoke
38
39
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the momentum of existing fraud on the market case law before
Basic, efficiency in the sense of financial economics became a
required allegation in fraud on the market cases.44 Cammer was
the first case post-Basic to offer a structured list of allegations
that might be sufficient, and courts adopted that list with little
thought or analysis, encouraged, perhaps, by the embrace of the
factors by the expert witnesses who came before them.45
Part II explains why the Cammer factors are junk science.
Put simply, none of the Cammer factors (nor the additional factors
added since) help establish whether the market for a security at
issue is efficient in the sense of financial economics. The Article
first explains how financial economists actually test for market
efficiency. It is not by way of anything resembling the Cammer
factors. The Article then explains why the Cammer factors and the
additional factors are not useful for determining this sort of efficiency of the market for a security at issue in securities fraud
litigation.
Part III argues for securities litigation without junk science
through a return to the common sense approach of the earliest
fraud on the market cases: if a security trades in a free and open
public market, then it is, in the sense of controlling Supreme
Court precedent, “efficient” and plaintiffs should be able to invoke the (rebuttable) fraud on the market presumption. The
Cammer factors remain unhelpful in making this determination.
What is important to the determination of a “free and open public
market” is the ability of active investors—investors other than
passive funds that will buy or sell according to index inclusion or
the like—to buy and sell in the market. This includes the determination whether there are substantial restrictions on participation like substantial lockups of potential sellers or bans on short

Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example,
that plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations were
publicly known (else how would the market take them into account?), that
the stock traded in an efficient market, and that the relevant transaction
took place ‘between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time
the truth was revealed.’”).
44 See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1261, 1281 (D.N.J. 1989).
45 See, e.g., Kelley v. Mid-Am. Racing Stables, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 405, 409
(W.D. Okla. 1990).
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selling. This approach is hardly anachronistic. Public markets that
are free and open are necessarily subject to the profit-seeking of
speculators, or so-called arbitrageurs.46 An enormous amount of
capital chases profit opportunities in the smallest of crevices,
from life insurance policy acquisition to litigation funding to gold
and silver coins to, of course, securities.47 The idea that a public
market for a security is not subject to the scrutiny and trading of
speculators is usually facially implausible absent evidence of substantial limits on their trading.48 I propose that plaintiffs be allowed to allege the existence of such free and open public markets
and defendants be allowed two possible showings at the class
certification stage to rebut the availability of the fraud on the
market presumption. First, as exists now, an opportunity to show
no price impact, though this must be done without the use of
junk science single-firm event studies.49 Second, an opportunity

46 Arthur E. Foulkes, Speculators important in free markets, TRIBUNE STAR
(June 20, 2008), https://www.tribstar.com/news/business_news/arthur-foulkes
-speculators-important-in-free-markets/article_709e0232-d741-5525-a746-83c0
d1545992.html [https://perma.cc/LNH3-HNE8].
47 Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 49 (2012).
48 Id. at 87.
49 See Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation:
Low Power, Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583 (2015)
(discussing the unreliability of single-firm event studies). This work has become
influential in the courts, leading the most astute courts to reject the need for
event studies in securities litigation. See In re EZCORP, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1990006, 2019 WL 1428008 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2019); In re Petrobras Sec., 862
F.3d 250, 278 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Brav & Heaton, supra, at 584–608)
(“Event studies offer the seductive promise of hard numbers and dispassionate truth, but methodological constraints limit their utility in the context of
single-firm analyses.”); Rooney v. EZCORP, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 439, 450 (W.D.
Tex. 2019) (citing Brav & Heaton, supra, at 602) (“A statistically significant
price adjustment following a corrective disclosure is evidence the original
misrepresentation did, in fact, affect the stock price. The converse, however,
is not true—the absence of a statistically significant price adjustment does
not show the stock price was unaffected by the misrepresentation.”); Pirnik v.
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., 327 F.R.D. 38, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting
Brav & Heaton, supra, at 593) (“With respect to the latter point, however, it
is Defendants’ burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the absence
of price impact, and they cannot meet that burden by pointing to a handful of dates
and suggesting, without further explanation, that one should have seen price
impact on those dates but did not. As for the former, ‘statistical significance
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to show that the market is, in fact, not a free and open public
market in the sense that there are substantial limitations on
buyers and sellers that do not allow their free interaction. At the
merits stage, defendants should also, of course, be able to show
that any particular plaintiff would have made their purchase or
sale at the affected price even knowing of the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. This formulation is consistent with all
controlling Supreme Court opinions. It is implementable today.
I.EFFICIENT MARKETS AND THE ROAD TO CAMMER
A.Fraud on the Market, B.C.—Before Cammer
Early fraud on the market cases50 made a modest demand
of securities markets: that market prices be “validly set”51 in the


is simply describing a set of returns that would be unusual to observe if there
was no price impact.’”); Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays
PLC, 310 F.R.D. 69, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Brav & Heaton, supra, at 584) (“In
academic research, event studies are almost exclusively conducted with large
samples of securities from a number of different firms. When the event study
is used in a litigation to examine a single firm, the chances of finding statistically significant results decrease dramatically.”).
50 There were almost two decades of fraud on the market litigation before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Basic, something even the best of students often miss:
Before Basic, securities-fraud plaintiffs suing as a class could
usually establish the “reliance” element only by showing that
each class member was aware of and traded a security based on a
specific falsehood. This requirement thwarted most attempts to
bring 10b-5 class actions, because individual issues of reliance
almost always eclipsed class-wide issues, preventing the action
from moving forward under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3). The Court’s 4–2 decision in Basic, however, upended
the existing individual-reliance regime and modified the private
10b-5 action to allow securities-fraud class actions to proceed.
See Note, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud
Class Actions, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2019) (citations omitted). This is
flat wrong. Even some securities scholars gloss over the overwhelming adoption of fraud on the market in the lower courts prior to Basic:
The complexity of the reliance issue became more apparent,
however, when the Court returned to the issue fifteen years later.
The logic of Affiliated Ute’s presumption of reliance did not
cover affirmative misstatements, so the obstacle that reliance
creates for class certification remained in those cases. The Court
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absence of manipulation. Courts had long accepted the reliability
of securities market pricing in other contexts, most notably shareholder appraisal cases.52 In a 1948 decision of New York’s Appellate Division involving the appraisal of shares of R.H. Macy &
Co., the court observed “that market value is the controlling
consideration where there is a free and open market and the
volume of transactions and conditions make the market a fair
reflection of the judgment of the buying and selling public.”53 The
idea was only that the market price reflected the thinking of a
variety of investors about a variety of matters.54 As another New
York opinion put it in 1952: “The bases for optimism and pessimism
on the part of investors, and their reactions thereto, cause some
to buy and others to sell. That is what creates a market, and the

in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, urged on by the SEC, and with Justice
Blackmun again writing for the majority, effectively completed
the dismantling of the reliance requirement by adopting the
‘fraud-on-the-market’ presumption of reliance.
A.C. Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 27, 33 (2015). Professor Fisch, among others, has pointed out this
ongoing misunderstanding:
Many commentators cite Basic as the foundation of modern
securities fraud litigation. Basic did not reflect, however, a
doctrinal shift. From the earliest cases addressing the implied
private right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, the lower courts recognized that it was impractical to impose a reliance requirement in
federal securities fraud litigation. Commentators similarly questioned the theoretical premise for requiring proof of reliance.
Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 900 (2013) (citations omitted).
51 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1975) stating the
purchaser:
relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly
set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price whether he is aware of it
or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations.
The Blackie court considered it “common sense that a stock purchaser does
not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock.”
Id. at 908.
52 See Application of Marcus, 273 A.D. 725, 727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
53 Id.
54 Id.
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market measures the value where, as here, it is free and open.”55
Bayless Manning would write in 1962 of shareholder appraisal actions that “courts have virtually refused to go beyond an inquiry
as to the market price on the date determined to be relevant.”56
When the matter at hand became securities fraud under
the Exchange Act instead of state law share appraisals57 and


Application of Deutschmann, 281 A.D. 14, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952). Interestingly, it took some time for financial economists to begin serious study
of such disagreement in financial markets. Early work on the topic includes:
George M. Constantinides, Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous
Consumers and without Demand Aggregation, 55 J. BUS. 253 (1982); Milton
Harris & Artur Raviv, Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race, REV. FIN.
STUD. 473 (1993); Mark Rubinstein, An Aggregation Theorem for Securities
Markets, 1 J. FIN. ECON. 225 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Divergence of Opinion in
Complete Markets: A Note, 40 J. FIN. 309 (1985). Much recent research focuses
on disagreement and its effects in financial markets. See generally, e.g., Adem
Atmaz & Suleyman Basak, Belief Dispersion in the Stock Market, 73 J. FIN.
1225 (2018) (modeling belief dispersion and its impact on returns, volatility,
and volume); Bruce I. Carlin, Francis A. Longstaff & Kyle Matoba, Disagreement and Asset Prices, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 226 (2014) (studying the effect of differences of opinion on asset prices). Almost 25 years ago, Professor Stout argued
for the importance of heterogeneous expectations in the legal understanding
of securities markets. Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611,
615–17 (1995).
56 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 232 (1962).
57 Interestingly, share appraisals today often reject market pricing in favor
of a battle of experts with input from sitting judges as well, especially in
Delaware where the use of market evidence has become nothing less than
erratic. See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.,
210 A.3d 128, 140 (Del. 2019) (reversing lower court’s use of the unaffected
pre-merger market price in favor of discounted cash flow valuation-based
appraisal); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177
A.3d 1, 24 (Del. 2017) (“Further, the Court of Chancery’s analysis ignored the
efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by this Court. It teaches that the
price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment
of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who
caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client.”);
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 369–70
(Del. 2017) (“Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation
techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single person’s discounted cash flow model,
the market price should distill the collective judgment of the many based on
all the publicly available information about a given company and the value of
its shares.”); In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., No. CV 12080-CB, 2018
WL 3625644, at *34 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018), judgment entered (Del. Ch.
55
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courts sought a way to allow securities fraud plaintiffs to avail
themselves of the class action procedure,58 all that was required
for fraud on the market theory was a recognition that traders
setting prices of securities at issue could be influenced by misinformation and, as a result, transact at prices reflecting the misinformation.59 An early court used the term “[t]he artificially
inflated market price theory”60 instead of “fraud on the market


2018) (rejecting pre-merger announcement closing price as the best evidence
of fair value of shares).
58 The earliest cases allowing class actions did not consider the fraud on
the market presumption but instead contemplated the possibility that the
trial court could order individual trials on reliance. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation omitted) (“We see no sound
reason why the trial court, if it determines individual reliance is an essential
element of the proof, cannot order separate trials on that particular issue, as
on the question of damages, if necessary. The effective administration of
23(b)(3) will often require the use of the ‘sensible device’ of split trials.”).
59 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1111 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(characterizing fraud on the market as “a variety of ways and over a span of
time the defendants concurred in wrongfully causing the market price of
Westec stock on the American Stock Exchange to be higher than it would
have been without such tortious conduct”). Commentators have traced judicial openness to the fraud on the market presumption to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private
Actions Under Sec Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 592–93 (1975) (“Although Affiliated Ute emphasized the nondisclosure aspects of that case, the
case of a plaintiff damaged by the effect of a deception on the open market
may also justify a presumption of reliance once the materiality of the deceptive practice is established. When a deception allegedly caused damage by
means of its impersonal effect on a securities market, proof of causation requires showing that the deception affected the market and that damage to
the plaintiff resulted.”). The Affiliated Ute decision was quite different, however. There, the Supreme Court held that reliance was unnecessary in an
omissions case if the facts would have been material to an investor. Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah, 406 U.S. at 153–54.
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might
have considered them important in the making of this decision.
Id.
60 In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. 443, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1974):
The artificially inflated market price theory makes it unnecessary to prove that each investor relied on the same misrepresentation. It is sufficient to show that there were different
misrepresentations which were a part of a common scheme to
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theory,” the former term better describing the nature of the cases
by focusing on the incorrect price rather than anthropomorphizing
the “market” as something capable of being defrauded like a person.61 The price impact on a free and open public market—which
then was embedded in the price at which plaintiffs traded—is
thus more akin to manipulation than fraud.62


manipulate the price of the stock. The facts of the instant case fit
this theory. It may develop that there is some variance between
misrepresentations, but the misrepresentations taken as a whole
appear part of an uninterrupted manipulation of the price over
the alleged class period.
Id. See also Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing
Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 1973)) (“Moreover, we
doubt that proof of actual reliance, as in a common law action for deceit, is
necessary in a 10b-5 action for damages. Rather, what plaintiff must show is
causation.”); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elecs. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (citing Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the “Reasonable Investor” Reasonable?, 72 COL. L. REV. 562, 576 (1972)) (“Demonstrating reliance in open
market situations such as here should not be necessary. Plaintiffs should be
required only to demonstrate a material misstatement by defendants.”).
61 In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. at 451.
62 See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A
Label in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV. 923, 950 (1988) (“Fraud on the
market, in some cases, is used as a synonym for market manipulation. The
statement that a trader is entitled to rely on the integrity of the market is the
equivalent of saying that a trader may suffer injury when the market or price
for a stock is tampered with. Accordingly, he may have a claim against dealers
that created an artificial price and an artificial market.”); Norman S. Poser,
Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 671, 716–17 (1986) (“It may be seen that the ‘fraud on the market’
theory is the first cousin, or possibly an even closer relative, of manipulation.
Under both concepts, the causal line between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s wrongdoing is not actual reliance on the defendant’s deceptive acts, but
damage to the free market.”); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1334 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub
nom. S. Tr. Metals, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 139 S. Ct.
1464 (2019) (“Teasing out the effect of market conditions in fraud-on-themarket cases is essential because the fraud alleged involves a manipulation
of stock price.”). As a legal matter, however, market manipulation cases involve
fraudulent transactions rather than misrepresentations. See Cellular S. Inc. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 516 F. App’x 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (“A complaint that raises a market manipulation claim must
allege ... manipulative acts .... ‘The gravamen of manipulation is deception of
investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell securities
are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by
manipulators.’”). Securities fraud, as a concept, generates a number of other
difficult-to-pin-down issues as well. For an analysis of many of these issues,
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The efficient markets hypothesis did not find its way into
reported fraud on the market litigation until 1980.63 Just before,
in a 1979 case arising under the Williams Act, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Tiger International, Inc.,64 cited earlier case law for the proposition that the stock market prices of a New York Stock Exchange–traded stock were usually the best reflection of the factors
that influenced valuation.65 The court invoked the efficient markets
hypothesis as further support for the reliability of such prices:
Underlying such an approach is the “efficient market theory,”
which, briefly stated, is that in a free and actively traded market,
absent compelling reasons to believe otherwise, the market price
is held to take account of asset value as well as the other economic, political, and financial factors that determine “value.”66

A year later came the first reported opinion linking the
fraud on the market theory with the efficient markets hypothesis.67 In a 1980 opinion from the Northern District of Texas, In
re LTV Securities Litigation,68 the district court invoked the efficient
markets hypothesis to support the fraud on the market theory.69
Fraud on the market—already the subject of more than a decade


see Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–15
(2011) (analyzing the nature of securities fraud).
63 See In re LTV Sec. Litig, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980). See also
Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation 2.0: An Essay in Honor of Don
Langevoort, 107 GEO. L.J. 795, 798 (2019) (“The efficient market theory that
financial economists began developing in the mid-twentieth century made its
way into securities law discussions by the early 1980s.”).
64 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1979).
65 Id. (citing Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1246–47 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)).
66 Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int’l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361–62
(2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Cases taking the opposite view were rare. See,
e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 484 F. Supp. 679, 683 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (demonstrating where the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York largely rejected Seaboard’s embrace of stock market
prices by allowing a mere expert affidavit from a Chartered Financial Analyst to create a fact issue as to whether the market value of the shares at
issue—traded on the Pacific Stock Exchange—were reliable).
67 See In re LTV Sec. Litig, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
68 Id. The LTV decision would heavily influence the United States Supreme
Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988).
69 Id.
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of judicial approval—was reasonable as an empirical matter
because “economists have now amassed sufficient empirical data
to justify a present belief that widely followed securities of larger
corporations are ‘efficiently’ priced: the market price of stocks
reflects all available public information—and hence necessarily,
any material misrepresentations as well.”70
This point is key: both of these courts—the Seaboard and
LTV courts—invoked the efficient markets hypothesis to add weight
to existing, sufficient precedent for accepting the reliability of
securities prices in free and open public markets.71 Theirs was an
appeal to the authority of a new social science of market efficiency
to add heft to an already adequate argument.72 Securities market prices were reliable not only because common sense and the
day-to-day reliance of investors on such prices suggested as much,
but because researchers in an increasingly prominent social science said so.73 Moreover, those academic researchers were disinterested, with no stake in the securities jurisprudence or the
cases at hand.74
Almost immediately, however, efficiency became more than
an ancillary argument in favor of the reliability of securities prices.
Soon, what started as an argument bolstering the reliability of
securities market pricing effectively raised the bar on just how

Id. at 144 (citing finance textbooks and a popular investment book).
Cf. Henry T. C. Hu, Corporate Distress, Credit Default Swaps, and Defaults:
Information and Traditional, Contingent, and Empty Creditors, 13 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 5, 9 (2018) (“In the 1970s, the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH) provided a social science foundation for the disclosure philosophy.”).
72 Efficient markets results entered legal commentary slowly at first. The
first discussions of efficient market theory in law reviews appears to be Stephen Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management
Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 776 (1976) (“The
obvious question raised by the efficient markets hypothesis is how legal doctrine should respond.”); B. Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory,
80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1614 (1971) (analyzing suitability requirements in light of
financial theory, including efficient markets theory); Walter Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The National Market System for Securities,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1274 (1975) (“The term ‘efficient markets’ is generally
employed by economists today to mean markets in which prices respond quickly
to new information.”).
73 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 72, at 1614.
74 Id.
70
71
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reliable that market pricing must be: it must be efficient.75 By
1982, one district court would claim: “Critical to the fraud-on-themarket theory is the assumption that market prices respond to
information disseminated (or not disseminated).76 This is sometimes referred to as an efficient market.”77 Another would claim,
citing the LTV decision, that the fraud-on-the-market theory “derives from the concept of an efficient market, which concept is
gaining judicial acceptance.”78 Both were misreadings of prior cases.
The fraud on the market theory had not required market
efficiency in the sense that financial economists used the term,
and it was certainly wrong as a historical matter that the presumption derived from that theory; the earliest cases were independent of the social science. What was accurate was to say, as
Professor Langevoort did in 1985, that “[o]ver the past decade,
the courts have implicitly recognized the efficient market hypothesis by adopting the ‘fraud on the market’ theory.”79 The
idea of a free and open public market is different than the idea
of an efficient market.80 The idea of a free and open market is, as
said in the R.H. Macy & Co. appraisal decision, that “the volume of
transactions and conditions make the market a fair reflection of
the judgment of the buying and selling public.”81 This is far less
demanding than market efficiency as financial economists use
the term, where prices reflect the correct implications for security
pricing of a particular subset of information.82 This subtlety was
lost on the courts.


75 As Professor Langevoort puts it well, “Efficiency-as-justification subtly
becomes efficiency-as-prerequisite, an instance of the economic mode of discourse
restricting, rather than expanding, the cognitive process of law-formulation.”
Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 900–01 (1992).
76 Fausett v. Am. Res. Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D. Utah
1982) (citing 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 8.6 (1981)) (emphasis added).
77 Id.
78 McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D. 331, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(citing In re LTV Sec. Litig, 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980)) (emphasis added).
79 Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 779 n.137 (1985) (emphasis added).
80 See infra text accompanying notes 81–82.
81 Application of Marcus, 273 A.D. 725, 727 (App. Div. 1948).
82 See generally Jim Chappelow, Market Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 29,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketefficiency.asp [https://per
ma.cc/6B75-ANJQ].
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As a result, in just about three years the fraud on the
market theory was said to be “grounded on the assumption that
the market price reflects all known material information.”83 A
1984 opinion in the Southern District of New York held “that the
‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory will only apply where the market
concerned is an efficient one.”84 This shift in premise from a “free
and open” market to an “efficient market” was advanced in part
due to the surprising influence of a 1982 Harvard student Note.85


83 T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irr. Fuel Auth., 717
F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). See also Rosenberg v.
Digilog Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (citation omitted) (“The central assumption of the theory is that the market price of a stock reflects all
representations made by defendant with respect to that stock.”); Gibb v.
Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59, 66 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (citation omitted) (“The
theory assumes that market price reflects all known material information.”)
Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 403 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citation omitted) (“The fraud on the market theory, as applied to a developed
securities market, assumes that the market price of stock reflects all available public information, including material misrepresentations.”).
84 Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241, 1264 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (emphasis added). The cases cited here and immediately above show the
error in Professor Korsmo’s claim that “[t]he FOTM doctrine, in pre-Basic judicial
practice, plainly relied on the uncontroversial notion that stock prices reflect and
respond to information in some fashion. Early decisions, however, rarely made
mention of the ECMH and did not claim that the FOTM presumption would be
appropriate only if markets were infallible.” Charles R. Korsmo, Market Efficiency and Fraud on the Market: The Danger of Halliburton, 18 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 827, 837 (2014). He goes on to say, “I was able to find only a single
district court opinion, In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142–45 (N.D. Tex.
1980), discussing the ECMH in the context of the FOTM doctrine, pre-Basic.”
Id. at 837 n.56. There were, in fact, many more cases following LTV.
85 Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1143
(1982). An equally insightful note was Michael A. Lynn, Fraud on the Market:
An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under Sec Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 627 (1982) which was cited in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247
n.26 (1988). Other law review commentary to address the fraud on the market
theory to that date did not mention market efficiency or the efficient markets
concept. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982) (demonstrating no mention of efficient markets in discussion of fraud on the market).
The themes first developed in the Harvard Note were further developed later
in Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435
(1984). Professor Black’s article took a stronger stand that market efficiency
should be a prerequisite to the availability of the fraud on the market presumption and her article was cited by Justice White’s concurrence in part and
dissent in part in Basic. Id. at 439; Basic, 485 U.S. at 254.
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In Levinson v. Basic Inc.,86 the 1986 opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that would so famously be
taken up two years later by the Supreme Court, the court relied
heavily on the Note’s characterization of the early case law in
discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory.87 The court then turned
to the Note’s view that “[t]he efficient-market hypothesis is the most
persuasive rationale for adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory”88
into an asserted third element necessary to invoke the theory,
requiring “that the stock was traded on an efficient market[.]”89
Courts began to suggest they would require plaintiffs to
prove not that a particular market was just free and open but
that it was “efficient,”90 and most commentators accepted without question the premise that the fraud on the market theory
rested on the efficient markets hypothesis, not just free and open
public markets.91 When the Supreme Court handed down Basic


86 Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S.
224 (1988).
87 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.26.
88 Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, supra note 85, at 1161.
89 Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485
U.S. 224 (1988):
In order to invoke the presumption of reliance based upon the
fraud on the market theory, a plaintiff must allege and prove
five elements. A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendants made public misrepresentations, ... (2) that the misrepresentations were material, (3) that the stock was traded on
an efficient market, ... (4) that the misrepresentations would
induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of
the stock, ... and (5) that the plaintiff traded in the stock between the time the misrepresentations were made and the
time the truth was revealed.
Id. (citations omitted). The court cited to precedent for each of the enumerated
elements, with the exception of the new third element, which the Court cited
to the Harvard student Note. Id. (citing Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory,
supra note 85, at 1161).
90 A & J Deutscher Family Fund v. Bullard, No. CV-85-1850-PAR, 1987
WL 16951, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1987) (citation omitted) (“Whether plaintiffs can show fraud-on-the-market—or put another way, whether the market
in this stock is efficient—is itself a common question.”).
91 See, e.g., Donald Eric Remensperger, Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market
Actions—Investors’ Insurance in the Second Circuit?; Panzirer v. Wolf, 49
BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1311 (1983) (“The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
(ECMH) provides the foundation for market fraud actions.”); Russell Robinson,
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and Thinly-Traded Securities Under Rule 10b-5:
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in 1988, the Court’s opinion retained some of the modesty of the
fraud on the market decisions that, like LTV, appealed to the
authority of the social science to support an arguably less onerous requirement than efficiency in the sense meant in financial
economics.92 But the Court said nothing to suggest that less-thanefficiency would do, and, as set out above, the case on appeal
had inserted the required element of efficiency.93 The efficiency

How Does a Court Decide If a Stock Market Is Efficient?, 25 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 251 (1990) (“But a showing of efficiency is important. Without such
a showing, the fraud-on-the-market theory loses its validity as a substitute
for reliance. Courts, therefore, must inquire into the nature of the security’s
efficiency. This means the courts must ask questions about the process of information regarding the security.”); Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027,
1063, n. 158 (1987) (“The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis has been used
as a basis for criticism and reformulation of legal policy in several areas. For
example, it furnishes a key premise for the fraud on the market theory, under
which the necessity to demonstrate reliance in rule 10b-5 actions (17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1986)) is eliminated.”); Peter H. Wemple, Rule 10b-5 Securities
Fraud: Regulating the Application of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory of
Liability, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 733, 746 (1985) (“To protect an individual
investor against fraud on efficient markets, the fraud-on-the-market theory
does not require proof of actual reliance. Such a requirement would actually
impede the purpose of securities laws to encourage market integrity.”).
92 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988):
The presumption is also supported by common sense and probability. Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress;
premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed
markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence,
any material misrepresentations. ... Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may
be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.
Id.
93 Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The Future of Price Distortion in Federal Securities Fraud
Litigation, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 91 (2015) (“Basic suggested
that its analysis depended critically on market efficiency. This led subsequent
courts to devote considerable effort to evaluating the extent to which the particular market in which a security traded was sufficiently efficient to justify the
Basic presumption.”); Ann M. Lipton, Halliburton and the Dog That Didn’t Bark,
10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2015) (“Thus, after Basic, courts faced two
conundrums: how open and developed must a market be before the fraud on
the market doctrine is deemed to apply? And if such an open and developed market exists, how ‘public’ and easily digestible must the information be before it is
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requirement already developed in the lower courts gained more
momentum. An efficiency inquiry became a shield for defendants.94
B.Cammer v. Bloom
After Basic, defendants became more aggressive in challenging allegations that the securities at issue traded in an efficient market.95 But how could a court determine if plaintiffs had

presumed to have an impact? These are related questions—the more developed the market, the more likely it is that obscure information will influence
stock prices—but the fraud on the market doctrine does not allow courts to (explicitly) adopt a sliding scale based on the interaction of market characteristics
and statement prominence. As a result, courts answered the questions with, respectively, ‘very,’ and (at least in some cases) ‘minimally.’”).
94 As a procedural matter, it is plaintiff’s burden to establish entitlement
to the fraud on the market presumption: The Basic presumption does not
relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving—before class certification—that
this requirement is met. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Basic instead establishes
that a plaintiff satisfies that burden by proving the prerequisites for invoking
the presumption—namely, publicity, materiality, market efficiency, and market
timing. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248–49. “The burden of proving those prerequisites
still rests with plaintiffs and (with the exception of materiality) must be
satisfied before class certification.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 276 (2014). Defendants can therefore challenge market
efficiency before class certification. In addition, “defendants must be afforded
an opportunity before class certification to defeat the presumption through
evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the market
price of the stock.” Id. at 284.
95 See, e.g., Guenther v. Pac. Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 333, 339 (D. Or.
1988) (“Defendants’ argument regarding the existence of an efficient market
raises two issues: (1) Whether the determination of an efficient market is a
proper issue to be resolved on a class certification motion; and (2) if it is,
whether plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to support a finding of an
efficient market.”); Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397, 1403
(D. Conn. 1988) (“The defendants contend that the plaintiffs should be precluded from utilizing that theory’s presumption of reliance because of the
plaintiffs’ failure to prove an essential element of that theory—an ‘efficient’
market for Memory Metals stock.”); Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., No. 3-851190, 1988 WL 146617, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 1988) (“Defendants argue
that plaintiff cannot establish an ‘efficient’ market for first issue bonds because the bond’s price does not reflect all available public information about
the economy, financial markets, and the specific company involved.”); In re
Tech. Equities Fed. Sec. Litig., No. C-86-20157(A) WAI, 1988 WL 147607, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1988) (“Defendants argue that the principle of ‘fraud on
the market’ cannot be applied with respect to reliance unless there exists an
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adequately alleged an efficient market? In 1989, a district judge
sitting in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey took up the challenge.96 Cammer v. Bloom presented
the question whether securities alleged to have traded in the
NASDAQ over-the-counter market traded in an efficient market.97 The auditor defendant argued “that only stocks trading on
either the New York or American stock exchanges should be
eligible for fraud on the market treatment.”98 Observing that the
auditor defendant sought “to have important distinctions drawn
based upon subtle differences between the trading atmospheres
at the national exchanges and the over-the-counter market[,]”99
the court properly recognized “no reasoned precedent for such
distinctions.”100
The court then sets off on a narrative frolic—free of citation to research from the social sciences—of ad hoc suggestions
for alleging an efficient market.101 Relying on a plaintiffs’ expert
affidavit offered to help salvage the eighteenth draft of an
amended complaint,102 as well as a securities treatise,103 the court

open, well developed and efficient market. They maintain that no such market existed for Technical Equities securities.”); Harman v. LyphoMed, Inc.,
122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“Defendants try to distinguish Basic.
They note that LyphoMed stock is traded over the counter, and that the fraud
on the market theory does not apply to such securities.”).
96 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1264–65 (D.N.J. 1989).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1280.
99 Id. at 1283.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1284–85.
102 Id. at 1278.
While the Amended Complaint—which is the product of twenty-nine capable law firms collaborating on essentially the
eighteenth draft—is void of facts which would support the invocation of the fraud on the market theory, plaintiffs have belatedly submitted the Poser Affidavit and numerous other
submissions which, they argue, amply demonstrate the efficiency of the market.
Id.
103 Wendy Gerwick Couture, Professor Alan R. Bromberg and the Scholarly
Role of the Treatise, 68 SMU L. REV. 703, 710 (2015).
In April 1989, Judge Alfred James Lechner, Jr., in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, issued
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offered its opinion on how to determine if securities at issue
traded in an efficient market.104 Whether or not the securities
traded on a national exchange was not determinative.105 But
being qualified to file the SEC’s Form S-3 was “an important
factor weighing in favor of a finding that a market is efficient.”106 The Cammer court claimed that “an average weekly
trading volume during the class period in excess of a certain
number of shares” could be probative of efficiency.107 In addition,
it “would be persuasive to allege a significant number of securities analysts followed and reported on a company’s stock during
the class period” since “[t]he existence of such analysts would
imply” that the auditor defendant’s reports “were closely reviewed by investment professionals, who would in turn make


Id.

Cammer v. Bloom, one of the first opinions to complete an indepth analysis of Basic’s application, and he cited Professor
Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels’ treatise nine times, quoting
from it extensively. First, he adopted their definition of market efficiency. Second, he agreed with them that market efficiency must be determined on an individualized basis. Third,
he identified a series of factors (the so-called Cammer factors)
that courts should consider when analyzing whether the market for a particular security was efficient .... Judge Lechner
relied on Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels’ guidance in
crafting four of these five factors.
104 Cammer,
105 Id.

711 F. Supp. at 1281.

It would be illogical to apply a presumption of reliance merely
because a security is traded within a certain ‘whole market’,
without considering the trading characteristics of the individual stock itself. Some well-followed stocks, such as Apple
Computer and MCI Telecommunications, have chosen to
trade in the over-the-counter market rather than on a national
exchange. On the other hand, some companies listed on national stock exchanges are relatively unknown and trade
there only because they met the eligibility requirements.
While the location of where a stock trades might be relevant,
it is not dispositive of whether the ‘current price reflects all
available information.’

Id.
106
107

Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
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buy/sell recommendations to client investors.”108 Having “numerous market makers”109 would make efficiency more likely since
“[t]he existence of market makers and arbitrageurs would ensure completion of the market mechanism; these individuals
would react swiftly to company news and reported financial results by buying or selling stock and driving it to a changed price
level.”110 Finally, the court stated:
it would be helpful to a plaintiff seeking to allege an efficient
market to allege empirical facts showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial
releases and an immediate response in the stock price. This,
after all, is the essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on the market theory.111

Professors Gordon and Kornhauser had warned four years
before Cammer that “the ability to test for market efficiency is
subject to question. Virtually none of this doubt, however, has
been reflected in the debates about the implications of the efficient
market hypothesis for legal decision making.”112 Consistent with
their caution, the Cammer court expressed no doubt about its
proposals for alleging (and presumably proving) market efficiency
for securities at issue.113 With considerable judicial hubris, the
Cammer court asserted that the answer to the question “Efficient
or not?” had answers in data about the type of SEC form an issuer
was entitled to use, the amount of weekly volume, the number of
securities analysts covering the security, the number of market
makers in the stock, and a quantification of price reactions to
events to show responsiveness to information.114 None of these
represented the view in financial economics.115

Id.
Id.
110 Id. at 1286–87.
111 Id. at 1287.
112 Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 765 (1985).
113 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1264–65.
114 Id. at 1286–87.
115 See generally Daniel Liberto, Financial Economics, Investopedia (Sept. 29,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-economics.asp [https://
perma.cc/VF6B-4RLE].
108
109
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C.The Consequences of Cammer
By virtue of offering an answer, any answer, to a pressing
question, Cammer, as the first mover, immediately influenced
courts throughout the country.116 Courts cited Cammer for its
plan of “a detailed inquiry into whether the market for the stock
is sufficiently active for the pricing mechanism to function and,
a priori, capable of being affected by the fraud.”117 Plaintiffs who
failed to allege these indicia of efficiency were thrown out by
courts citing Cammer.118 Within a year, a district judge sitting
on the United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma
would cite Cammer for which “factors might be examined to determine a market’s efficiency.”119 The term stuck. Soon the

See Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 107 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We take note
of the thorough analysis in Cammer ... where the district court, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, considered whether
plaintiffs’ affidavit showed ‘specific fact’ indicating an efficient market.”); In
re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(“Not only do Plaintiffs specifically state that the market was efficient, but
they also set forth several of the indicia of a well-developed, efficient market
mentioned in Cammer. Accordingly, at least at this juncture in the proceedings,
the plaintiffs in Feld may proceed on the fraud on the market theory of presumed
reliance.”); Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (“In Cammer ... the court listed examples of allegations helpful in meeting the efficient market requirement.”); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754
F. Supp. 785, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (“In the absence of Ninth Circuit authority,
the court finds that the Cammer criteria are helpful in determining whether
the market is efficient.”); Stinson v. Van Valley Dev. Corp., 719 F. Supp. 362,
363 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1274–75) (“In Cammer ... the court offered the following indicia of market efficiency sufficient to
satisfy this threshold: (1) sufficient weekly trading volume, (2) reports and
analysis by investment professionals, (3) market makers and arbitragers, (4)
eligibility to file S-3 Registration Statement, and (5) historical showing of
immediate price response to unexpected events or financial releases.”).
117 In re Bexar Cty. Health Facility Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 602,
607 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
118 Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264, 1289 (D.N.J. 1990)
(citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87) (“In this case, the Plaintiffs have
failed to allege or present facts sufficient to raise the inference that Hughes
Capital securities were traded on an open and developed market.”).
119 Kelley v. Mid-Am. Racing Stables, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 405, 409 (W.D.
Okla. 1990) (emphasis added).
116
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“Cammer factors” were the benchmark test for market efficiency.120
Defendants argued that a plaintiff must allege all five of the
Cammer factors,121 and some courts suggested the same.122 One


120 Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990)
(“The court in Cammer identified five factors that would be useful in proving
that a security was traded in an efficient market ....”); Simpson v. Specialty
Retail Concepts, 823 F. Supp. 353, 354 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (“This court finds the
Cammer factors instructive and will follow its lead.”).
121 See In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. 91-20084 SW, 1991
WL 253003, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1991) (quoting Cammer, 711 F. Supp.
at 1285–86) (“Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ allegation of an efficient market is deficient because it is not supported by specific allegations of the five
types of facts mentioned in Cammer .... However, the Cammer court did not
hold that the plaintiff must allege all five types of facts in order to establish
that the market was open and efficient. The court simply stated that ‘[t]here
are several types of facts which, if alleged, might give rise to an inference
that [the defendant] traded in an efficient market.’ By listing five types of
facts, the court was merely suggesting possible ways of alleging the existence
of an open and efficient market. The court did not attempt to delineate the
minimum pleading requirements.”).
122 See, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 475 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Binder v.
Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cammer, 711 F. Supp.
at 1286–87) (“The Cammer factors are designed to help make the central
determination of efficiency in a particular market. They address five characteristics of the company and its stock: first, whether the stock trades at a
high weekly volume; second, whether securities analysts follow and report on
the stock; third, whether the stock has market makers and arbitrageurs;
fourth, whether the company is eligible to file SEC registration form S-3, as
opposed to form S-1 or S-2; and fifth, whether there are ‘empirical facts showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or
financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price.’ ... The district court determined that Binder offered evidence only as to the presence of
market makers and arbitrageurs. We agree with the district court that this
factor alone is insufficient as a matter of law to deem the market for AVBC
stock efficient. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s decision to decertify the
class through December 1993.”); In re Surebeam Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV
1721JM(POR), 2005 WL 5036360, at *24 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2005) (“Because
both parties agree that the Cammer factors should determine fraud on the
market and Plaintiff has not addressed any of the Cammer factors, the Complaint does not adequately plead reliance through the fraud-on-the-market
theory. Similarly, the Complaint does not set out any factors that would
indicate direct reliance on the misstatements, so reliance is inadequately
pled.”); Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, 906 F. Supp. 1470, 1481 (D. Utah 1994),
aff’d, 69 F.3d 547 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (“Plaintiffs, without alleging
trading volume, plead the pure legal conclusion that Global had an efficient
and well developed market for its stock. In support of that conclusion, plaintiffs
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court found the fraud on the market theory was “particularly
applicable to a large national market such as the NYSE”123 because the Cammer factors fit such a market well, a preposterous
example of the legal tail wagging the real-world dog; surely we
did not need the Cammer factors to tell us that the fraud on the
market presumption was suited to NYSE stocks.124


allege that five of the plaintiffs had this ‘impression’ ‘based on the existence
of up to fourteen separate market makers during the class period.’ No allegations suggest that these market makers were actually misled or otherwise
misunderstood Global’s situation in any way or otherwise link them with the
dates of plaintiffs’ market purchases. No allegations show active trading at
any time by the market makers. The volume of the market for Global shares
is not alleged. There is no allegation that Global enjoyed the status of being a
Form S-3 registrant. Additionally, the allegations of penny market prices,
inconsistent financial statements, off market transactions at off market prices,
all demonstrate that Global’s market does not meet the requirements set
forth in Basic .... Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate where
there are inadequate factual allegations to show an efficient, developed market.”); Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 799, 804 (D. Colo. 1993) (citing
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87 (“The fraud-on-the-market theory requires
showing that the security was traded in large volume during the time period
at issue, that a significant number of securities’ analysts followed and reported on the security and that the price changed in relation to public statements
or reports about the activities of the issuer.”); Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–
87) (“Similarly, the court failed to evaluate the significance of the marketefficiency factors lacking in the instant case. For instance, the number of
securities analysts following the stock is an important factor .... Hence, the
fact that no analyst was reporting on Amedisys stock at the time in question
should have been weighed against the rather scant utility of, for example, the
number of ‘market makers.’ Further, the court did not address the effect on
the market efficiency determination of Amedisys’s ineligibility to file an SEC
Form S-3 at the time in question (the other factor absent in this case). Because Rule 23 mandates a complete analysis of ‘fraud on the market’ indicators, district courts must address and weigh factors both for and against
market efficiency.”).
123 In re Laidlaw Sec. Litig., No. 91-CV-1829, 1992 WL 68341, at *10 n.8
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1992) (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1264; Freeman v.
Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990)).
124 Some decisions of the district courts are nearly impossible to square
with the evidence that stock traded in an efficient market. See Charles W.
Murdock, Halliburton, Basic, and Fraud on the Market: The Need for A New
Paradigm, 60 VILL. L. REV. 203, 229 (2015) (suggesting “a lack of objectivity
and an outcome determinative mentality from the court” in the outcome of In
re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2006), a case
with strong facts demonstrating efficiency that the court unconvincingly
characterized as “weak”).
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A decade or so after Cammer, the influence of the factors
reached a more absurd level, with courts engaged in “angels on
the head of a pin” scrutiny of which and how many Cammer factors
were sufficient:
While it is clear that satisfaction of only one Cammer factor is
not sufficient as a matter of law to prove the existence of an
efficient market, it appears no case has addressed how many
Cammer factors must be alleged to plead reliance under a
fraud-on-the-market theory. Reviewing plaintiffs’ allegations
in this case, the court concludes that pleading two of the five
factors is not sufficient .... Plaintiffs have not only failed to
plead a majority of the factors, but ... [the issuer] files a Form
S-1, not a Form S-3, registration statement. For these reasons,
the court finds that plaintiffs have not alleged reliance under
a fraud-on-the-market theory with sufficient particularity.125

When additional factors were added to the list, the combinations exploded. There were 31 possible combinations of five
factors; there were 255 combinations of eight factors. Decisions began to vary erratically.126 Defendants focused in on the Cammer
fifth factor—a history of immediate stock price movements in response to unexpected corporate events and financial releases—
because that factor was the junkiest of all, susceptible to the
worst of arguments that the market for a security at issue was
inefficient.127 It was (and remains) an expert witness’s dream. It
was also (and remains) hogwash.

In re Turbodyne Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV9900697MMMBQRX,
2000 WL 33961193, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2000) (citations omitted). The
court noted that “[a]ssuming plaintiffs can plead additional Cammer factors,
it is not clear that the fact Turbodyne files a Form S-1 precludes a finding
that its stock trades in an efficient market.” Id. at *14 n.108.
126 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient: The Variability of Federal Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in Cammer v. Bloom
and Its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 303, 305 (2002) (“I suggest that
while the courts in question may appear to be sufficiently sophisticated to
discern the level of efficiency in a securities market, in fact they are not. The
courts embrace a laundry list of factors economists have suggested as indicators of market efficiency, but fail to show an aptitude for considering these
factors in a deeper, contextual fashion.”). See also David Tabak, Counting
Cammer Factors—A Review of Case Law, LAW360 (Aug. 30, 2012), https://
www.law360.com/articles/372672/counting-cammer-factors-a-review-of-case-law
[https://perma.cc/R2EV-3TER].
127 See, e.g., In re Sci.-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1339
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (citations omitted) (“In support of that position, Defendants
125
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II.CAMMER IS JUNK SCIENCE
A.How Financial Economists Test for Efficiency: (Tradeable)
Predictable Returns
Market efficiency128 is one of those concepts that is in one
sense easy to understand while remaining rather technical.

rely on the affidavit of their expert, Dr. Cox, who conducted an ‘event study’
which analyzed the effect of 20 allegedly fraudulent statements identified in
the Complaint on the market price of SA stock. According to Dr. Cox, the
results of his event study did not show statistically significant positive stock
price movement in response to these allegedly fraudulent statements. Based
on these results, he opines that ‘[t]he Complaint’s efficiency claim is inconsistent with its allegations of material false and misleading statements.’”);
O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (“[Plaintiff’s expert]
attempted to show instances of a fall in the price of [the] stock in response to
the dissemination of adverse information. [Defendant’s expert] demonstrated,
however, that within days thereafter, the price rose almost to its original
level, without any dissemination of ‘good news’ that could account for the
increase.”). This practice continues. See, e.g., Monroe Cty. Employees’ Ret.
Sys. v. S. Co., No. 1:17-CV-00241-WMR, 2019 WL 2482399, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
June 12, 2019) (“Plaintiffs note that Dr. Gompers testified that he only considered the fifth Cammer factor when evaluating market efficiency. Plaintiffs
contend that by refusing to even consider the other factors, Dr. Gompers’
opinion is not only inconsistent with binding legal authority, but also that it
is unreliable as it is based on a biased, cherry-picked review of the record
that ignores all contrary evidence.”). The strategy still comes close to working
with courts who do not understand (as explained further below) that statistical significance is meaningless in determining market efficiency under the fifth
Cammer factor. See, e.g., Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 328
F.R.D. 86, 96–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[Defendant] Och-Ziff argues that [plaintiff’s expert] Dr. Nye’s data failed to show that the stock price actually reacted
to news events. Whereas only 5% of a random sampling of days is expected to
produce statistically significant price movement, Dr. Nye found statistically
significant price movement in the days following eight of the seventeen news
events—or 47.1%. Och-Ziff argues that this is too low a percentage. This is
perhaps Och-Ziff’s strongest argument. While Nye’s event study still shows a
significant cause-and-effect relationship between news events and price movement, this objection nevertheless weakens the Nye Report’s persuasive force.”)
(citations omitted); City of Cape Coral Mun. Firefighters’ Ret. Plan v. Emergent Biosolutions, Inc., HQ, 322 F. Supp. 3d 676, 687 (D. Md. 2018) (“Defendants only challenge Lead Plaintiffs’ conclusion that the fifth, empirical Cammer
factor cuts in favor of market efficiency in this case.”).
128 This Article is concerned with informational efficiency: the idea that
prices fully reflect a given subset of information. On its own, this says nothing
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Lawyers without formal training in its theoretical underpinnings
and its relation to the rest of financial economics have consistently struggled as a result. It is not true, for example, that “[a]n
efficient capital market is one in which the current price of a
security is the best estimate of what the price of that security
will be in the future”129 because, among other reasons, future
prices can be efficient but be expected to increase by the return
required in equilibrium.130 It is true that “[s]ecurities that trade
in efficient markets have rapid price adjustments to new information[,]”131 one way to shorthand the theory. But even this is

about the “allocational efficiency” of the stock market, that is, whether the
stock market does a good job of drawing capital into socially optimal pursuits.
The assumption that market efficiency is an important social goal is due
partly to the assumption that efficient prices facilitate allocative efficiency.
See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 980 (1992) (analyzing allocative mistakes, among other
social costs of inefficient prices); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 616 (1988) (noting one assumption “necessary to
the view that improving market efficiency is an important goal of securities
regulation ... is that accurate stock prices are desirable because stock market
prices influence the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and
services in the economy.”). Importantly, that which improves informational
efficiency can lead to poor allocative efficiency, see Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1607, 1670 (2015), and presumably vice versa. Professor Yadav makes a
strong argument for potential allocative inefficiencies of high-frequency trading even as most research suggests (and Professor Yadav acknowledges) that
high-frequency trading improves informational efficiency. See, e.g., Jonathan
Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott, & Ryan Riordan, High-Frequency Trading and
Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267, 2303–04 (2014) (demonstrating that
the trading patterns of high-frequency traders are suggestive of informationally efficient trading).
129 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059,
1076 (1990) (citing Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 n.9
(1982)). Neither Macey, Miller, nor Fischel are trained financial economists.
130 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970) (describing next period’s price in
terms of an equilibrium expected return model).
131 Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Measuring Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 106 (2000).
The rest of the quote is inaccurate, however: “... whereas those in inefficient



452 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:417
an “if A, then B” logic that must be used with care: if a security
trades in an efficient market, then it has a rapid price adjustment to new information. It is, of course, a basic logical fallacy to
argue from there that “if B, then A,” that is, if a security has a
rapid price adjustment to new information, then it trades in an
efficient market. The adjustment could be rapid but very wrong.
The best starting place for understanding the efficient
markets hypothesis remains Professor Fama’s 1970 review article,132 where he observes that “[a]ll empirical research on the
theory of efficient markets has been concerned with whether
prices ‘fully reflect’ particular subsets of available information.”133
Both parts of this concern are important to understand.134 “Fully
reflect” means that the information under study cannot be used
to earn superior risk-adjusted returns.135 “Particular subsets” is
important as well.136 A test must specify the information that is
hypothesized to be fully reflected in the price.137 One can certainly hypothesize that the prior history of prices is fully reflected

markets do not.” Prices could, of course, react quickly but highly inaccurately
when news is released.
132 Fama, supra note 130, at 383. As of 2006, this was the 20th most-cited
article in all of economics since 1970. E. Han Kim, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales,
What Has Mattered to Economics Since 1970, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189,
193 (2006).
133 Fama, supra note 130, at 388. Of course, prices will likely reflect only
the information that is worth acquiring on the margin. See Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991) (citing Michael C.
Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON.
95 (1978)) (“A weaker and economically more sensible version of the efficiency
hypothesis says that prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed
the marginal costs.”).
134 See Fama, supra note 130, at 388.
135 See id. at 388, 413–14. It is important to note that the question is almost
always whether the information can be used to generate superior returns, not
whether the price is fundamentally “correct.” Because the existence of superior
returns requires positing some model of how returns are generated, however,
there is a link to models of market equilibrium that are, in essence, models of
how assets should be priced if the assumptions of the model hold.
136 A formal and precise exposition of this concept is Mark Latham, Informational Efficiency and Information Subsets, 41 J. FIN. 39, 39–41 (1986) (presenting a
formalization of Fama’s notion of efficiency with respect to subsets of information).
137 See id. at 39.
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in the price (called “weak-form efficiency”),138 that all publicly
available information is reflected in the price (called “semistrong form efficiency”),139 or that all information—private as
well—is reflected in price (called “strong-form efficiency”).140 But
in all cases, the testing of that hypothesis requires the identification of the subset of information that is assumed under the hypothesis to be available to the market.141 This has long been a
source of considerable difficulty in practice.142
Nevertheless, there is one test that nearly all financial economists agree on,143 even if its application in specific situations
can be controversial.144 That is a test for the short-run tradeable

Id. at 39–41.
Id.
140 Id.
141 See id. at 40.
142 See Daniel Friedman, Glenn W. Harrison & Jon W. Salmon, The Informational Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 349, 350
(1984) (“A fundamental difficulty in devising any test of such general efficient
market hypotheses, however, is the specification of the relevant public and private
information sets of traders. Without a consensus as to reasonable empirical
specifications, tests of the hypotheses remain minimal or controversial.”).
143 There are many tests of market efficiency where financial economists
do not even agree that the test is capable of distinguishing efficient from
inefficient prices. See generally Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too
Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
421, 433–34 (1981). The best known of these are tests of whether stocks are
too volatile to be consistent with ex post cash flows (dividends) to stocks. See
generally id. Such tests are directed more at whether prices reflect a particular
view of fundamental value than the reaction of prices to information. See id.
(arguing that the variance of stock prices is inconsistent with the present value
model of future dividends); Stephen F. LeRoy & Richard D. Porter, The PresentValue Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds, 49 ECONOMETRICA
555, 559 (1981) (similar); Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficiency and the Variability of
Asset Prices, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 184–85 (1984) (arguing against the
interpretation of market inefficiency); Terry A. Marsh & Robert C. Merton,
Dividend Variability and Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock
Market Prices, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 483, 483–84 (1986) (criticizing the reliability of variance-bounds tests of market efficiency); Robert J. Shiller, The Use of
Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency, 36 J. FIN. 291–92 (1981)
(defending use of volatility measures to judge market efficiency).
144 See, e.g., John M. Griffin, Patrick J. Kelly & Federico Nardari, Do Market
Efficiency Measures Yield Correct Inferences? A Comparison of Developed and
Emerging Markets, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3225, 3226 (2010).
138
139
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(that is, potentially profitable, after trading costs) predictability
of stock returns, whether the predictor is some feature of the timeseries of past prices or some non-price information like an earnings announcement.145 The presence of such predictable returns
would suggest that traders could earn superior risk-adjusted returns by investing in the securities under test.146 Indeed, the theory
of market efficiency has its roots in the empirical fact that early
researchers determined that stock price changes for individual
stocks were essentially unpredictable, and therefore, untradeable
in a consistently profitable way.147 In his groundbreaking article,
The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices,148 Eugene F. Fama presented the strongest evidence to that date that the past history
of an individual stock’s returns was not useful in predicting
stock returns.149 He characterized his results as “consistent with
the existence of an ‘efficient’ market for securities, that is, a market where, given the available information, actual prices at every

See, e.g., id. (testing efficiency “in terms of a) a practical notion of efficiency:
the returns to trading strategies based on past returns and earnings announcements; and b) the deviations prices exhibit from the random walk paradigm.”).
146 See Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J.
ECON. LIT. 1583, 1583–84 (1989) (“It is only differences in information—information that is not ‘fully reflected’ in prices—that confer comparative advantage, and that therefore can form the basis for profitable trading rules.”).
147 See Fama, supra note 130, at 383 (“Though we proceed from theory to
empirical work, to keep the proper historical perspective we should note that
to a large extent the empirical work in this area preceded the development of
the theory.”). The unpredictability of prices appears first to have been set out
by Louis Bachelier, The Theory of Speculation (A. James Boness, trans.), in
THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK PRICES (Paul H. Cootner, ed.). Fama’s
work also benefited from the insights of Maurice G. Kendall, The Analysis of
Economic Time-Series, Part I: Prices, 116 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 11 (1953) (presenting empirical evidence of a random walk in indices of stock prices); and
M.F.M. Osborne, Brownian Motion in the Stock Market, 7 OPERATIONS RES.
145 (1959) (documenting random walks in individual stocks); Holbrook Working, The Investigation of Economic Expectations, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 150,
159–60 (1949) (setting out reasons why changes in futures prices should be
“completely unpredictable”).
148 Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965).
149 Professor Fama studied the 30 stocks that comprised the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. Id. at 45. See also Eugene F. Fama & Marshall E. Blume,
Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading, 39 J. BUS. 226, 240 (1966) (concluding “that our results add further to the evidence that for practical purposes
the random-walk model is an adequate description of price behavior.”).
145

2020]

KILL CAMMER

455

point in time represent very good estimates of intrinsic values.”150
Such weak-form efficiency is virtually never rejected in any free
and open public market. By comparison to the Cammer factors
discussed below, the examination of returns for predictability is
mostly a matter of applying accepted methodology correctly and
accounting for measurement error and transactions costs (so as
not to suggests tradeable predictability where it does not exist).151
Empirical results on the lack of tradeable short-run predictable returns are consistent with—and help explain—findings
on the inability of professionals to beat the market.152 The first
well-known study of the ability of professionals to find mispriced
securities was by Alfred Cowles, published in 1933 in Econometrica.153 Cowles found that “the most successful records are little,
if any, better than what might be expected to result from pure
chance.”154 Additional tests began in earnest in the mid-1960s.
For example, Professor William F. Sharpe (who would go on to
share the Nobel Prize in Economics for the development of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model) published his paper, Mutual Fund
Performance,155 in 1966, finding support for “the view that the
capital market is highly efficient and that good [mutual fund]

Fama, supra note 148, at 90 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Hendrik Bessembinder & Kalok Chan, Market Efficiency and
the Returns to Technical Analysis, 27 FIN. MGMT. 5 (1998) (documenting
measurement error and lack of robustness to trading costs of simple technical
trading rules). Given the wide acceptance of weak-form efficiency as the most
basic requirement of market efficiency, it is ironic that one court that considered the Cammer factors refused to consider evidence of a random walk,
presumably because the expert and/or the counsel did a very poor job of explaining the analysis. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-159,
2002 WL 32076175, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (“[The expert] asserts
that the ‘relationship between market efficiency and the random walk character of price changes is well-recognized in the economics and finance literature’ and ‘has testable implications.’ [citation to affidavit]. However, Plaintiffs
have provided no specific instances where the relationship is recognized.”).
152 See Alfred Cowles, Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?, 1 ECONOMETRICA 309, 324 (1933); William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J.
BUS. 119, 138 (1966) (illustrating that professionals evaluate risk and diversity rather than trying to beat the market).
153 Cowles, supra note 152, at 309.
154 Id. at 324.
155 Sharpe, supra note 152, at 119.
150
151
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managers concentrate on evaluating risk and providing diversification, spending little effort (and money) on the search for incorrectly priced securities.”156 In his 1968 study,157 Professor
Michael C. Jensen found similar evidence.158 Subsequent decades
have witnessed the mounting of evidence against the ability of
active investors to beat the apparently efficient securities markets. Passive index funds continue to beat active equity managers.159 This inability of professional money managers to beat
passive benchmarks is, for many, highly persuasive evidence of
market efficiency.160

Id. at 138.
Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period
1945–1964, 23 J. FIN. 389 (1968).
158 Id. at 415.
159 Daisy Maxey & Chris Dieterich, Indexes Beat Stock Pickers Even Over 15
Years, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/indexes-beat
-stock-pickers-even-over-15-years-1492039859 [https://perma.cc/QX47-476Z];
Chris Newlands & Madison Marriage, 99% of Actively Managed US Equity
Funds Underperform, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content
/e139d940-977d-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582 [https://perma.cc/3VFU-6EDL] Accumulated evidence of underperformance by active managers has generated a
massive shift to passive investing. See, e.g., Kate Beioley, US active funds suffer
record $143bn “exodus” in December, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www
.ft.com/content/4b863bbe-1a7a-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21; Corrie Driebusch, Investors Pulling More Money From Actively Managed U.S. Stock Funds, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-pulling-more-money
-from-actively-managed-u-s-stock-funds-1452702638 [https://perma.cc/76D5
-7VAX]; Chris Flood, Vanguard Retains Title as World’s Fastest-Growing Asset
Manager, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/753e1afe-f149
-11e7-ac08-07c3086a2625 [https://perma.cc/W4D2-HMWL]; Attracta Mooney,
Passive Funds Grew 4.5 Times Faster Than Active in 2016, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c4f6ee56-e48c-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a [https://
perma.cc/C9QB-R5J9].
160 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Two Pillars of Asset Pricing, 104 AM. ECON.
REV. 1467, 1482 (2014) (“However one judges market efficiency, it has motivated a massive body of empirical work that has enhanced our understanding
of markets, and, like it or not, professional money managers have to address
its challenges.”); Stanley J. Kon & Frank C. Jen, The Investment Performance
of Mutual Funds: An Empirical Investigation of Timing, Selectivity, and Market
Efficiency, 52 J. BUS. 263, 263 (1979) (observing that Jensen’s mutual fund
studies “have been cited as support for the strong form of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH); that is, whether any investor has monopolistic access
to any information relevant for price formation”).
156
157
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While market efficiency remains the subject of ongoing
research in financial economics,161 it is crucial to acknowledge
that financial economists virtually never test, as litigants do,
whether the pricing of a single stock is efficient.162 The reason is
more or less the same as the reasons Alon Brav and I gave for
the glaring difference between single-firm event studies in securities litigation and the multi-firm event studies used in academic
research163: single-firm tests have extremely low statistical power and the ability to predict single-firm returns is very poor.164
For this reason, financial economists look for evidence of inefficiency by studying many firms, usually in portfolios, to increase
the statistical power of their tests.165 Second, and relatedly, by
using more powerful tests on portfolios of many firms, evidence
of inefficiencies such as this that are (arguably) found can have

See, e.g., Shmuel Baruch, Marios Panayides & Kumar Venkataraman,
Informed Trading and Price Discovery Before Corporate Events, 125 J. FIN.
ECON. 561, 561–62 (2017) (presenting evidence on the incorporation of information); Jonathan Brogaard, Allen Carrion, Thibaut Moyaert, Ryan Riordan,
Andriy Shkilko & Konstantin Sokolov, High Frequency Trading and Extreme Price
Movements, J. FIN. ECON. 253, 253–54 (2018) (studying the effect of highfrequency traders around extreme price movements); Markus Brunnermeier,
Information Leakage and Market Efficiency, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 417, 417 (2005)
(studying the use of leaked information by an informed trader); Jennifer
Conrad, Sunil Wahal & Jin Xiang, High-Frequency Quoting, Trading and the
Efficiency of Prices, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 271 (2015) (finding that high frequency trading reduces trading costs and drives prices closer to random-walk
behavior); Murray Z. Frank & Ali Sanati, How Does the Stock Market Absorb
Shocks?, 129 J. FIN. ECON. 136, 136 (2018) (examining market responses to positive and negative news); Jeewon Jang & Jangkoo Kang, Probability of Price
Crashes, Rational Speculative Bubbles, and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns,
132 J. FIN. ECON. 222, 222–23 (2019) (examining the trading of sophisticated
investors around times of high probability of extreme negative returns); George J.
Jiang & Kevin X. Zhu, Information Shocks and Short-Term Market Underreaction, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 43, 43 (2017) (studying price reactions to information
shocks); Clara Vega, Stock Price Reaction to Public and Private Information,
82 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 103–04 (2006) (studying the market efficiency association of information with the arrival of informed and uninformed traders).
162 Brav & Heaton, supra note 49, at 583.
163 Id.
164 See Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541, 541 (1988) (demonstrating the lack
of predictive ability of regressions to predict individual stock returns).
165 See id.
161
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very small “effect sizes”166 that may have little real-world significance for an active trader.167
B.Cammer Does Something Else
1.A Large Weekly Trading Volume
The first Cammer factor is a large trading volume: “First,
plaintiffs could have alleged there existed an average weekly
trading volume during the class period in excess of a certain number of shares.”168 According to the Cammer court:
[t]he reason the existence of an actively traded market, as evidenced by a large weekly volume of stock trades, suggests there
is an efficient market is because it implies significant investor
interest in the company. Such interest, in turn, implies a likelihood that many investors are executing trades on the basis
of newly available or disseminated corporate information.169

Of course, there is nothing about “significant investor interest in the company” that implies that trades resulting from
such interest are “execut[ed] ... on the basis of newly available or
disseminated information[,]” and nothing suggesting that such
trading, if it occurs, is trading that fully reflects the information
quickly in the stock price.170
The Cammer court cited the Bromberg and Lowenfels
treatise, Bromberg & Lowenfels, 4 Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud, § 8.6 (Aug. 1988), for the proposition that
“[t]urnover measured by average weekly trading of two percent
or more of the outstanding shares would justify a strong presumption that the market for the security is an efficient one; one

166 A good source on effect sizes and relation to statistical power is PAUL D.
ELLIS, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO EFFECT SIZES: STATISTICAL POWER, METAANALYSIS, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS (2010).
167 See, e.g., Allen B. Atkins & Edward A. Dyl, Price Reversals, Bid-Ask
Spreads, and Market Efficiency, 25 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 535, 535
(1990) (presenting evidence that possible overreactions after large price changes
are not profitable after taking transactions costs into account).
168 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989).
169 Id.
170 Id.
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percent would justify a substantial presumption.”171 This was
utter speculation by the commentators, neither of whom would
reasonably be considered an expert in the efficient markets hypothesis. Certainly, there was nothing in the existing literature
to justify their assertion.
Volume is neither necessary nor sufficient for efficiency.172
There is, in fact, a certain irony to the fact that a large volume is
the first Cammer factor. One of the more intriguing results in
rational expectations economics is the “no-trade theorem” of Paul
Milgrom and Nancy Stokey.173 To put their insight simply, prices
in their model adjust with no trade because rational agents immediately recognize the price implications of new information.174
The evidence on volume in financial economics is often interpreted
as evidence of disagreement about price, in the sense that high
volume is not expected when traders agree on the implications of
new information for price.175 Volume is also related to liquidity
needs—selling for cash rather than information trading.176 In all
cases, price and volume seem to be related in complicated ways,177
none of which allow volume to be a test for efficiency.

Id.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
173 Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17, 17 (1982).
174 Id. at 17–18.
175 This disagreement can be rational or irrational. See, e.g., Jonathan M.
Karpoff, A Theory of Trading Volume, 41 J. FIN. 1069, 1069 (1986) (presenting
a theory of volume including agreement, disagreement, and divergent prior expectations); Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders
Are Above Average, 53 J. FIN. 1887, 1887 (1998) (studying the effects of overconfidence on trade, including its tendency to increase volume); Meir Statman,
Steven Thorley & Keith Vorkink, Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume, 19
REV. FIN. STUD. 1531, 1531 (2006) (attributing high volume to investor overconfidence about their trading skills); Ho-Mou Wu & Wen-Chung Guo, Asset
Price Volatility and Trading Volume with Rational Beliefs, 23 J. ECON. THEORY
795, 795 (2004) (studying the relation between volume and belief structures
in rational markets).
176 See, e.g., Joon Chae, Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and
Timing Information, 60 J. FIN. 413, 413 (2005) (“Trading volume is generally
characterized as either informed or uninformed (liquidity trading).”).
177 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Relation Between Price Changes
and Trading Volume: A Survey, 22 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 109, 109
171
172
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2.A Significant Number of Reports by Securities Analysts
The second Cammer factor is the existence of a significant
number of reports by securities analysts: “Second, it would be
persuasive to allege a significant number of securities analysts
followed and reported on a company’s stock during the class
period.”178 Here, the Cammer court’s rationale was that
[t]he existence of such analysts would imply, for example, the
[auditor reports at issue] were closely reviewed by investment
professionals, who would in turn make buy/sell recommendations
to client investors. In this way the market price of the stock
would be bid up or down to reflect the financial information contained in the [auditor’s] reports, as interpreted by the securities analysts.179

This assumes a wealth of facts about the behavior of securities analysts and the response of client investors to their “buy/sell
recommendations[,]” none of which implies price efficiency.180
The court cited no source for its speculations here, not even the
Bromberg & Lowenfels treatise.181
In fact, the importance of analysts in financial markets is
questionable.182 Analysts are known to provide distorted recommendations.183 Only a small minority of analyst recommendation changes seem to matter in markets, and even those depend

(1987); Paula A. Tkac, A Trading Volume Benchmark: Theory and Evidence,
34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 89, 89 (1999).
178 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989).
179 Id.
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Joonghyuk Kim, Susan D. Krische &
Charles M.C. Lee, Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add
Value?, 59 J. FIN. 1083, 1083 (2004) (providing evidence of both value-destructive
and value-added analyst activity); Brett Trueman, Analyst Forecasts and Herding
Behavior, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 97, 97 (1994) (finding that analysts stay close to
prior earnings estimates and herd toward each other’s estimates); Ivo Welch,
Herding Among Security Analysts, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 369, 369 (2000) (demonstrating that analysts herd but not in a useful way on good information).
183 See Ulrike Malmendier & Devin Shanthikumar, Do Security Analysts
Speak in Two Tongues?, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 1287, 1287 (2014) (studying strategic distortions by security analysts).
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heavily on whether the analyst is a reputational leader, is moving
away from the consensus view, and what type of firm is involved.184
The usefulness of analysts depends on the state of the economy.185
Analysts with less industry experience before becoming analysts
make poorer forecasts than analysts with industry-related prior
experience.186 There is evidence that analysts add little or no
value in the twentieth century,187 and excessive analyst coverage has been associated with overpricing and low returns.188
This second Cammer factor has another flaw, one that it
shares with the next two Cammer factors as well: it tends to be a
proxy for market capitalization.189 Larger firms have more analysts.190 While this size-bias may tend to generate correct efficiency
determinations in cases involving large firms, it necessarily creates a relative bias against smaller firms that are—if traded on
national exchanges exposed to professional traders—also quite
likely to be traded in efficient markets.191


184 See, e.g., Michael B. Clement & Senyo Y. Tse, Financial Analyst Characteristics and Herding Behavior in Forecasting, 60 J. FIN. 307, 307 (2005)
(distinguishing between the value of analyst forecasts that are “bold” versus
“herding” with other analysts); Roger K. Loh & René M. Stulz, When Are
Analyst Recommendation Changes Influential?, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 593, 593
(2011) (“We show that only 12% of recommendation changes are influential.
Recommendation changes are more likely to be influential if they are from
leader, star, previously influential analysts, issued away from consensus,
accompanied by earnings forecasts, and issued on growth, small, high institutional ownership, or high forecast dispersion firms.”).
185 Roger K. Loh & René M. Stulz, Is Sell-Side Research More Valuable in
Bad Times?, 73 J. FIN. 959, 959 (2018) (presenting evidence that analysts
work harder and are relied on more in bad economic times).
186 Daniel Bradley, Sinan Gokkaya & Xi Liu, Before an Analyst Becomes
an Analyst: Does Industry Experience Matter?, 72 J. FIN. 751, 751 (2017).
187 See, e.g., Oya Altinkilic, Robert S. Hansen, & Liyu Ye, Can Analysts
Pick Stocks for the Long Run?, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 371 (2016) (finding a
reduced information role for analysts in the period after 2003); Robert S.
Hansen, What is the Value of Sell-Side Analysts? Evidence from Coverage
Changes—A Discussion, 60 J. ACCT. & ECON. 58, 64 (2015) (discussing evidence that “evidence indicating analysts’ reports are not particularly informative
for the average investor”).
188 John A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim & Christos Pantzalis, The Two
Faces of Analyst Coverage, 34 FIN. MGMT. 99, 99 (2005).
189 O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
190 Id. at 501.
191 See Richard Roll, A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect, 36 J.
FIN. 879, 879 (1981).

462 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:417
3.The Existence of Market-Makers and Arbitrageurs in the
Security
The third Cammer factor is the existence of market-makers
and arbitrageurs in the security:
Third, it could be alleged the stock had numerous market makers.
The existence of market makers and arbitrageurs would ensure
completion of the market mechanism; these individuals would
react swiftly to company news and reported financial results by
buying or selling stock and driving it to a changed price level.192

Again, the Cammer court cited no source.193 And, again,
the existence of market makers and arbitrageurs does not imply
“swiftly” reacting prices.194 Perhaps such prices that result from
their presence are efficient; perhaps they are not. The market
makers must not just be there; they must be good at their job.
Professor Fama’s original work on the efficient markets hypothesis recognized as much, asking how many superior predictors
of new information and processors of that information—the arbitrageurs in the Cammer framework—would be necessary to ensure
that successive price changes were independent?195 He answered,
“It is impossible to give a firm answer ... since the effectiveness of
the superior [traders] probably depends more on the extent of their
resources than on their number. Perhaps a single, well-informed
and well-endowed specialist in each security is sufficient.”196

Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989). One court,
though accepting the factor itself, rejected the speculations of Bromberg and
Lowenfels about the number of such market makers necessary for efficiency.
See O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 502 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (citing Bromberg and Lowenfels,
§ 8.6 at 8.815) (“Bromberg and Lowenfelds [sic] suggest a rule of thumb,
under which the existence of at least five market makers would be some indicia
of efficiency .... The authors do not cite any case law or economic studies to
support their rule of thumb. As noted in the text above, the economic studies
clearly do not support the authors’ suggestion. Furthermore, both Dr. Cox
and Mr. Kangas testified that the rules of thumb suggested by Bromberg and
Lowenfelds [sic] have no support in the economic literature. Therefore, I reject
their rules of thumb as being unsupported speculation.”).
193 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286.
194 See O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 501–02.
195 See Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1987); Fama, supra note
148, at 40.
196 Fama, supra note 148, at 40.
192
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There is no authority in financial economics for linking market
efficiency to a counting of arbitrageurs.197
Another objection to using, as an indicator of market efficiency, the mere presence of arbitrageurs is a phenomenon known
as the “limits to arbitrage”198—the possibility that mispricing
can sometimes be difficult to bet against.199 The limits to arbitrage
argument is powerful, with considerable support.200 It suggests
reasons why this Cammer factor is unreliable, and also cautions—as discussed further below—against assuming a free and
open public market without some look at whether such limits to
arbitrage are important for the security at issue.201
This factor, as mentioned above, is also likely to be too
correlated with market capitalization to add much above it and
is therefore relatively biased against small firms that nevertheless trade in efficient markets.202

197 The role of arbitrageurs in financial markets is a subject of much study.
See, e.g., Suleyman Basak & Benjamin Croitoru, On the Role of Arbitrageurs
in Rational Markets, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 143, 143 (2006) (providing an example
of an article discussing the role of arbitrageurs in financial markets).
198 The seminal work is Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits to
Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35 (1997) (presenting a theoretical model where arbitrageurs are limited in their ability to take advantage of mispricing because investors
may withdraw funds if the mispricing gets worse before being corrected).
199 Id. at 42.
200 See, e.g., Malcolm Baker & Serkan Savasoglu, Limited Arbitrage in
Mergers and Acquisitions, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 93–94 (2002) (finding evidence
of limited arbitrage in risk arbitrage around mergers and acquisitions); John
A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim & Christos Pantzalis, Arbitrage Risk and
Stock Mispricing, 45 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 907, 907 (2010) (finding
supportive evidence); Mark Mitchell, Todd Pulvino & Erik Stafford, Limited
Arbitrage in Equity Markets, 57 J. FIN. 551, 551–52 (2002) (identifying apparent
mispricing of parent companies relative to their subsidiary, and attributing
the survival of the mispricing to the risks of arbitrage); Eli Ofek, Matthew
Richardson & Robert F. Whitelaw, Limited Arbitrage and Short Sales Restrictions: Evidence from the Options Markets, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (2004)
(finding evidence of limits to arbitrage in options markets); Jeffrey Pontiff, Costly
Arbitrage: Evidence from Closed-End Funds, 111 Q.J. ECON. 1135, 1136 (1996)
(documenting limits to arbitrage against high-discount closed-end funds).
201 See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits to Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35 (1997).
202 See O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
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4.The Eligibility of the Company to File an S-3 Registration
Statement
The fourth Cammer factor is the eligibility of the issuer to
file an S-3 registration statement:
Fourth, as discussed, it would be helpful to allege the Company
was entitled to file an S-3 Registration Statement in connection with public offerings or, if ineligible, such ineligibility was
only because of timing factors rather than because the minimum stock requirements set forth in the instructions to Form
S-3 were not met. Again, it is the number of shares traded
and value of shares outstanding that involve the facts which
imply efficiency.203

This factor was based on the fact that the Securities and
Exchange Commission allowed issuers to use Form S-3 if they,
“are widely followed by professional analysts[,]”204 since the
Commission believed, “that the market operates efficiently for
these companies, i.e., that the disclosure in Exchange Act reports and other communications by the registrant, such as press
releases, has already been disseminated and accounted for by
the market place.”205
Thus, the Form S-3 factor is redundant of the second factor—the presence of securities analysts—and simply pushes the
buck to the Commission: the securities of issuers that can use
Form S-3 are probably efficient because the SEC allows Form S3 for issuers it thinks are trading in efficient markets.206 Of
course, the SEC is almost surely correct, but not because they
have been conscientious in testing for efficiency every issuer
able to file on Form S-3. Finally, as mentioned above, this factor
is essentially a proxy for market capitalization, and therefore
relatively biased against smaller firms.207

Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989).
Id. at 1284 (quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg.
63,693 (1980)).
205 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1284.
206 See id. at 1284–85.
207 See O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 503.
203
204
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5.Movement of the Stock Price Caused by Unexpected
Corporate Events or Financial Releases
The fifth Cammer factor is a history of immediate movement of the stock price caused by unexpected corporate events or
financial releases:
Finally, it would be helpful to a plaintiff seeking to allege an
efficient market to allege empirical facts showing a cause and
effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price.
This, after all, is the essence of an efficient market and the
foundation for the fraud on the market theory.208

There are two elementary errors at play here.209 The first
error is that a price need not react to any particular unexpected
corporate event or financial release.210 As Professor Langevoort
has observed, markets may not react because, “the market had
figured out the essential truth on its own[,]”211 or, said differently,
the events identified by experts and their staffs in litigation and
then compared against the price series for reaction may already
have been impacted in the price through an unidentified means
of information transmission.212 But the real problem comes in
defining what it means to react. In practice, the definition, until
recently, meant the generation of statistically significant price
reactions, that is, identifying events and then concluding that
the market is inefficient if the resulting price reaction is not
statistically significant.213 This test assumes that prices are not
efficient unless price reactions are large enough to be statistically
significant.214 This reflects a serious misunderstanding of both
efficiency and statistics.215

Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287.
See id.
210 See Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
37, 57 (2015).
211 Id. at 54.
212 See id. at 52.
213 See id. at 46–47.
214 See id.
215 Some confusion in the cases appears to trace to the mistaken characterization of statistical significance in an influential article by a law professor
208
209
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Prices can react efficiently to information even though the
price reactions themselves are not so large in size as to approach
statistical significance.216 Statistical significance is just a measure
of the size of a reaction relative to its average and its variability,
but nothing says that the corporate event must have a certain size
to be efficiently reflected in the security’s price, especially since, as
just observed, part of the information may already be in the price
before the news released identified by the litigant’s expert.217 Thus,
while a statistically significant reaction to a firm-specific news event
might be evidence that information was reflected in the price (absent confounding effects), the converse is not true—the failure of
the price to react so extremely as to be two standard deviations
from average does not establish that the market is inefficient; it
may mean only that the correctly sized value impact that occurred was less than 1.96 standard deviations from the mean.218

without advanced training in financial economics. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use
of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (1982). Fischel incorrectly assumed that returns
needed to be statistically significant against an assumed model to be evidence
of injury:
By comparing this predicted return with the actual return immediately after disclosure in 1978 of the correct information, a
conclusion could be reached about the effect of the alleged failure
to disclose the costs of compliance with environmental regulations. If the difference between the actual return and the predicted return is not statistically significant, investors were
not injured.
Id. at 19. Fischel appears not to have understood the low statistical power of
his model and how that renders statistical significance unreliable for determining price impact (injury). See id.
216 One frequent securities expert witness studies the stocks in the S&P
500, and found that some stocks “respond to earnings announcements in a
statistically significant manner only about half of the time, implying that a
requirement that a stock respond in a statistically significant manner to news
events all or nearly all the time may not be consistent with the data.” Tabak,
supra note 13. Given the almost unquestionable efficiency of the pricing of
this set of stocks—if they are not efficiently priced, none are—this is a nearideal illustration of the disconnect between a price reaction and whether that
reaction is so large as to reach statistical significance.
217 See id.
218 See STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE,
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There are court opinions in nine-figure securities cases that
would fail a college freshman’s statistics exam on such reasoning, as in the case of In re American International Group, Inc.,219
a case where the court determined that defendants had rebutted
the fraud-on-the-market presumption on certain dates because
price moves were statistically significant only at the 10 percent
level (size) but not the 5 percent level.220 It used to be rare but
refreshing when courts got it right.221 As courts have become
more aware of the games defendants play in such situations, they
have begun more frequently rejecting the junk science requirement of statistical significance proffered by defense experts.222

AND LIVES, at 1–2, 45, 222 (2008) (providing for a definitive treatment of the
widespread misunderstanding of statistical significance and its consequences).
219 265 F.R.D. 157, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated and remanded, 689 F.3d
229 (2d Cir. 2012).
220 The court determined that the lack of a statistically significant price
move at the 5% level on March 30 and 31, 2005, demonstrated that the fraud
had not impacted the stock price. Id. at 185–87. The same court’s determinations regarding AIG bonds have been severely criticized as well. See Hartzmark et al., supra note 9, at 654–55 (criticizing the AIG court, which “found
insufficient empirical evidence to hold that the $1.71 billion in AIG bonds,
issued by the world’s largest insurance company, traded in open, developed,
and efficient markets.”). Courts continue to botch the application of this factor in
more recent cases. See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan
Mortg. Corp., No. 4:08CV0160, 2018 WL 3861840, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14,
2018) (“Upon weighing the evidence, as the Court must, the Court holds that
OPERS has failed to establish market efficiency.”) Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s market capitalization was in the many billions of dollars.
The Court plainly lacked an understanding of the statistical evidence. Id. at
11 (“Statistical significance, however, is essential to give meaning to statistical evidence. As courts have recognized, absent statistical significance, correlation is meaningless.”).
221 In one reported case, the judge saw through the fallacious argument
that “in an efficient market material news should result in a statistically
significant change in [the issuer’s] stock price.” In re Nature’s Sunshine Product’s
Inc., 251 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Utah 2008) (rejecting defendants’ argument that
market for stock was not efficient because “of the 93 event days chosen by
[plaintiffs’ expert], only 23 of those days (or less than 25%) result in a statistically significant change to Nature’s stock price”).
222 See, e.g., Vizirgianakis v. Aeterna Zentaris, Inc., No. 18-2474, 2019 WL
2305491, at *2 (3d Cir. May 30, 2019) (“Aeterna’s hired expert, Dr. David
Tabak, responded to the declaration of plaintiffs’ expert, pointing out that Dr.
Werner had not proven—to a 95% confidence level—that the alleged misrepresentations made on August 30, 2011 impacted the price of Aeterna’s common stock. The district court found this evidence insufficient to rebut the
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The second error is that the existence of a large price reaction
does not imply efficiency or the need for news.223 Why assume that
the large price reaction was accurate?224 Statistical significance
certainly does not imply accuracy.225 Indeed, a price overreaction
will generally achieve a higher level of statistical significance than
an accurate price reaction.226 Early commentators recognized even
before Cammer that, “[t]he fact that trades affect stock prices,
however, is unrelated to the efficient market thesis, as is the fact
that traders act upon the available information.”227
The fact is that while prices in efficient markets react
quickly,228 the fully reflective price reaction may be too small to
reach statistical significance.229 That should not matter, since
statistical significance is nothing more than a measure of relative size, and nothing in the law says that only price impacts
that big or bigger are actionable.230 Additionally, the presence of


presumption. It aptly noted that plaintiffs do not have the burden to prove price
impact (or lack thereof), so it was not surprising that their expert’s report did
no such thing.”).
223 See David Romer, Rational Asset-Price Movements Without News, 83
AM. ECON. REV. 1112, 1113 (1993) (demonstrating the potential for prices to
react because of the trading of other traders rather than news).
224 See, e.g., Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes,
and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 454 (2006) (“A stock can be
significantly mispriced and still respond promptly to news. For example, a
stock that was overpriced by fifty percent could jump ten percent in response
to a positive announcement, as many dot-com stocks did, and still be overpriced by fifty percent, if not more.”).
225 See id. at 449.
226 This is because an overreaction will be larger in magnitude and thus
more likely to be significant, since the test statistic is typically a function of
the observed price less the average price.
227 Black, supra note 62, at 933.
228 Price reactions on exchanges have reacted quickly for decades. See, e.g.,
Catherine S. Woodruff & A.J. Senchack, Jr., Intradaily Price-Volume Adjustments of NYSE Stocks to Unexpected Earnings, 43 J. FIN. 467 (1988)
(studying speed of adjustment to earnings surprises); Prem C. Jain, Response
of Hourly Stock Prices and Trading Volume to Economic News, 61 J. BUS. 219
(1988) (studying speed of adjustment to macroeconomic news). This is even
more so today.
229 See Cornell & Rutten, supra note 224, at 449.
230 Thus, assertions that some number of returns must be statistically significant are illogical and not based in any proper reasoning from financial
economics. For an example of such an assertion by a defendant, see Wilson v.
LSB Indus., Inc., No. 15CIV7614RAGWG, 2018 WL 3913115, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.
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statistical significance does not imply accuracy, and therefore, does
not imply efficiency.231 Again, as a measure of size—relative to
the average and the variability of the return or price—statistical
significance is more likely to be found when prices overreact than
react correctly.232
C.Other Factors
In Krogman v. Sterritt,233 the District Court for the Northern
District of Texas stated that “[e]conomic theory suggests that
several other factors may be relevant in determining market
efficiency[,]” citing another case that cited two law review articles.234 It appears, however, that these additional factors were
proposed by defendant’s economic expert.235 Unsurprisingly,
these factors are no more reliable than the Cammer factors.
1.The Capitalization of the Company
Krogman asserted that “[m]arket capitalization, calculated
as the number of shares multiplied by the prevailing share price,
may be an indicator of market efficiency because there is a greater
incentive for stock purchasers to invest in more highly capitalized corporations.”236 There is no support in the literature for
this assertion.
The “incentive” for investing in a security is often a complex
question of risk and return, where both are rationally analyzed
with respect to the other assets that the investor owns. There is,
in finance theory, nothing to suggest that the security of a highly
capitalized corporation is per se more attractive to an investor,
and it is easy to come up with counterexamples where that
would not be true, such as if the security of the highly capitalized

Aug. 13, 2018) (“Next, defendants assert that the event study failed to establish
market efficiency because it found statistically significant residual returns on
only two of the three dates it analyzed.”). The court was unpersuaded by this
misleading argument. Id.
231 See Tabak, supra note 13.
232 See id.
233 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
234 Id. at 477.
235 Id. at 478.
236 Id.
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corporation had a poor risk-return contribution to the investor’s
current portfolio than the security of a small-capitalization firm.
Put more bluntly, any student in an introductory investment class
asked to determine whether a security was a good investment for a
hypothetical investor would get zero credit for an answer that a
particular security was a good investment because the firm that
issued it had a high market capitalization.
Larger capitalization firms may be more efficiently priced
than smaller firms,237 but this does not imply that smaller firms
are not priced quite efficiently, though in lesser degree than
large firms.238
2.The Bid-Ask Spread of the Stock
Krogman also asserted that “[a] large bid-ask spread is
indicative of an inefficient market, because it suggests that the
stock is too expensive to trade.”239 There is no evidence for this
assertion.
As with the first Krogman factor (high capitalization), the
rationale given—“the stock is too expensive to trade”—is nonsensical.240 If that were true, there would be no trades for the
security at the assumedly large bid-ask spread. But firms with
large bid-ask spreads trade, just at the larger spread.241 In any
event, bid-ask spread does not measure inefficiency.242 Bid-ask
spreads are sensitive to information imbalances, and the bid-ask
spread compensates in part for the risks of this asymmetry.243


237 See, e.g., Josef Lakonishok & Inmoo Lee, Are Insider Trades Informative?, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 79, 82 (2001) (finding that insider trading is more
profitable at smaller firms, consistent with the conjecture that larger firms
are more efficiently priced).
238 See Bradford Cornell & John Haut, How Efficient Is Sufficient: Applying the Concept of Market Efficiency in Litigation, 74 BUS. LAW. 417, 420–22
(2019) (discussing different degrees of efficiency).
239 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
240 Id. at 474.
241 Id. at 478.
242 Id.
243 See Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the BidAsk Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457, 1457–58, 1465 (1983); Lawrence R. Glosten,
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread and the Statistical Properties of Transactions Prices, 42 J. FIN. 1293, 1293 (1987) (decomposing the bid-ask spread
into a component related to information asymmetry and a component related
to monopoly power); Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating
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There are also reasons why in an efficient market the bid-ask
spread will increase as the size of the firm decreases.244 Bid-ask
spread also measures liquidity.245 In the large literature that
exists on the bid-ask spread,246 researchers do not equate bidask spreads with efficiency or characterize stocks with large bidask spreads as being “too expensive to trade.”247
3.The Percentage of Stock Not Held by Insiders
Finally, Krogman quoted the expert’s affidavit in asserting
that “[b]ecause insiders may have private information that is not
yet reflected in stock prices, the prices of stocks that have greater
holdings by insiders are less likely to accurately reflect all available information about the security.”248 There is no evidence to
support the conjecture that publicly traded stocks with high insider
ownership are inefficiently priced. To the contrary, the market
appears to charge a higher cost of equity where informed insider
trading may be used to exploit investors.249


the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 131, 140–41
(1988) (demonstrating that a significant amount of the spread is due to information asymmetry; P.C. Venkatesh & R. Chiang, Information Asymmetry
and the Dealer’s Bid-Ask Spread: A Case Study of Earnings and Dividend
Announcements, 41 J. FIN. 1089, 1090 (1986) (studying dealer use of the bidask spread in response to possible information asymmetry).
244 See generally Richard Roll, A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective
Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market, 39 J. FIN. 1127 (1984). See also J.Y.
Choi, Dan Salandro & Kuldeep Shastri, On the Estimation of the Bid-Ask
Spreads: Theory and Evidence, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 219
(1988) (confirming Roll’s model in empirical tests).
245 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the BidAsk Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 243 (1986) (“And, rather than suggesting
an ‘anomaly’ or an indication of market inefficiency, our return-spread relation represents a rational response by an efficient market to the existence of
the spread.”); Benjamin M. Blau & Ryan J. Whitby, The Volatility of Bid-Ask
Spreads, 44 FIN. MGMT. 851, 851, 869 (2015) (examining the relation between
bid-ask spreads and returns due to liquidity).
246 In addition to the sources cited above, see also Hans R. Stoll, Inferring
the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests, 44 J. FIN.
115 (1989).
247 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 245, at 243.
248 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
249 See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider
Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 97 (2002) (finding that the enforcement of insider
trading laws reduces the cost of equity).
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Of course, all firms have insiders that may have private
information not yet reflected in stock prices,250 but there is no
reason to believe that firms with greater holdings by insiders have
more such information. This factor also illustrates well a serious
problem with a list of ad hoc factors: they can tempt a court to
view factors one a time instead of considering the factors in light of
one another.251 The Krogman court asserted that inside ownership
could lead to inefficient pricing, but inside ownership is prevalent
at some of today’s largest market-capitalization companies like
Alphabet Inc. (Google) and Facebook.252 The idea that the securities of these companies are not traded in an efficient market (for
purposes of the fraud on the market presumption) because of their
high percentage insider ownership is absurd and without support in any reliable financial economic studies.
III.A FREE AND OPEN PUBLIC MARKET IS EFFICIENT
How can we do securities litigation without junk science?
The best thing after killing Cammer would be a return to the early
days of the fraud on the market presumption, with a modern check.
Those were days that required only a free and open public market.253 In Basic, the Supreme Court quoted the following sentence from an earlier Eleventh Circuit case: “The idea of a free
and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security
brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as
nearly as possible a just price.”254 The idea of a “free and open
public market” is, of course, an abstraction like the idea of an
“efficient market.” But it is a far less demanding abstraction. As the

See, e.g., Shijung Cheng, Venky Nagar & Madhav V. Rajan, Insider Trades
and Private Information: The Special Case of Delayed-Disclosure Trades, 20
REV. FIN. STUD. 1833, 1861 (2007) (finding strong evidence of the informativeness of certain insider trades at S&P 500 firms).
251 See Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 474 (enumerating factors courts consider
when addressing degree of market efficiency).
252 Id. at 478.
253 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 475 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting the
internet rendered Cammer factors useless).
254 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (quoting Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 748 (CA11 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985)).
250
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Cammer court recognized, “An open market is one in which anyone, or at least a large number of persons, can buy or sell.”255
For courts that must—even when they deal in theories and abstractions—make decisions about the messy real world, the notion of “a free and open public market” is far better suited to
litigation than the financial economists’ ever-evolving theory of
efficient markets.256 Appealing to the existence of social science
evidence in 1979 and 1980 was unnecessary but understandable
for courts relying—as they long had—on securities market prices.257
Requiring market efficiency in the exact sense of this theoretical
concept was a mistake. It is also clearly not what the Supreme
Court intended in Basic, where the Court expressly disavowed
adopting “any particular theory of how quickly and completely
publicly available information is reflected in market price.”258
The fact that the meaning of “efficiency” in fraud on the market
jurisprudence was not identical to that of financial economics
was again emphasized in the Court’s 2014 Halliburton decision,
rejecting a
focus[ ] on the debate among economists about the degree to
which the market price of a company’s stock reflects public information about the company—and thus the degree to which an
investor can earn an abnormal, above-market return by trading
on such information .... The Court instead based the [Basic] presumption on the fairly modest premise that “market professionals
generally consider most publicly announced material statements
about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.” ...
Even the foremost critics of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis acknowledge that public information generally affects
stock prices.259


Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting
Bromberg & Lowenfels § 8.6).
256 Id. at 1276.
257 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 255.
258 Id. at 248 n.28.
259 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 271–72 (2014).
It is important to recognize, however, that the Supreme Court only a year before
had arguably characterized the fraud on the market presumption as one that
“springs from the very concept of market efficiency.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 462 (2013). This is language reminiscent of
those courts that may forget the origins of fraud on the market in a preefficient markets framework, though the later characterization of efficiency in
255
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Complying with Basic’s demand for efficiency as emphasized in Halliburton demands that there be a free and open public market where information is reflected in market price quickly
and completely enough for it to be reasonable to consider that
the price at which plaintiffs purchased or sold was artificial as a
result of the alleged fraud.260 A plaintiff invokes the presumption by pleading the existence of a free and open public market
for the security at issue, that is, the ability of buyers and sellers
to engage in securities trades without significant restrictions on
either buyers or sellers.261 For class certification, a plaintiff would
present evidence on the free and open nature of the market for
the security.262 Can investors buy and sell in the market without
substantial restrictions on participation like substantial lockups
of potential sellers or bans on short selling?263 The answer for
exchange-traded securities will—as it should be—almost always
be yes.264
But here is the modern check: sometimes there will be sufficient constraints—violations of the “free and open” requirement—
that will make the presumption unavailable, such as an inability
to sell short which can prevent the market price from reflecting the
views of relatively pessimistic traders265 or lockups that remove

Halliburton suggests this to mean nothing more than that the market responds
quickly and completely (to some extent) to new information.
260 Halliburton Co., 573 U.S. at 282–83.
261 See id. at 259–60, 268.
262 See id. at 258, 261.
263 See Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32
J. FIN. 1151, 1162 (1977).
264 See Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and
Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 210–11 (2002).
265 The classic explanation is Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162 (1977) (stating that “without short
selling the price of a security is raised if there is divergence of opinion. A sufficient
amount of short selling could increase the volume of the security outstanding
until its price was forced down to the average valuation of all investors.”).
There is substantial evidence that short selling is important to market pricing. See, e.g., Ekkehart Boehmer & Juan (Julie) Wu, Short Selling and the
Price Discovery Process, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 287, 318 (2013) (documenting the
greater accuracy of stock prices when short sellers are active); Karl B. Diether,
Kuan-Hui Lee & Ingrid M. Werner, Short-Sale Strategies and Return Predictability, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 575, 604 (2009) (examining the extent and
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potential sellers from participating in the market, with results
akin to short-selling restrictions.266
Overall, if you can look it up on a Bloomberg terminal and
trade it with a major financial firm, it is almost surely worthy of
the label “efficient” for purposes of fraud on the market, absent
independent proof of truly binding restrictions on the trading of
an important subset of potential buyers or sellers.267
Efficiency in this sense is consistent with the commonsense approach of the fraud on the market jurisprudence before
the introduction of efficiency in the social science sense, the sense
of financial economics.268 It also is consistent with the Court’s
jurisprudence on the duties of ERISA fiduciaries.269 It was in 2014,
the same year as Halliburton, when the Court in Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer held that it “usually is not imprudent
to assume that a major stock market ... provides the best estimate of the value of the stocks traded on it that is available to


importance of short selling in U.S. stocks); Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 237
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267 This approach is also consistent with the fact that courts generally do
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securities, since such securities are sold only by the issuer and are not subject to
the views of other sellers, including short sellers. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen
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sellers off the market for a time. In addition, options trading is often delayed
for short time after an IPO. Put options trades are one way for investors with
a negative view on a stock to bet against it.
268 See Basic v. Levinson, 268 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (citing to literature
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him.”270 Efficiency for fraud on the market purposes need not be
any more difficult. Just as it “usually is not imprudent” for an
ERISA fiduciary “to assume that a major stock market ... provides
the best estimate of the value of the stocks traded on it that is
available to him[,]” it usually is not imprudent for an investor to
assume the same, and certainly it usually is not imprudent to
assume that false information disseminated in such a market
can create an artificial price at which investors will trade.271 Of
course, “usually” is not “always,” and there may be evidence of
sufficient problems in the relevant market—problems that limit
the interaction of active buyers and sellers—to call the assumption
(and the resulting presumption) into question.272 In those cases,
the presumption might be unavailable, and in all cases, the defendant would, at the class certification stage, retain its ability
to demonstrate the lack of a price impact (which is the lack of
fraud-induced artificiality) in the price of the security at issue.273
The point is, all this work can be done more easily and far more
reliably without the junk science of the Cammer factors.
CONCLUSION
In a 2010 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he absence of Cammer efficiency
does not mean that prices are unreliable.”274 This was a laudable
statement, but far from enough. Cammer is junk science. The
Cammer factors (and the additional factors that courts use) do
not do what they claim: distinguish efficient security pricing from
inefficient security pricing.275 Normally, junk science comes to
litigation via the parties and safeguards on the admissibility of
expert opinion—while by no means always adequate—to catch
much of it and prevent it from living long in our legal system.
When a judge fashions the junk science, as occurred in Cammer,
and when other judges adopt the junk science, it can live on for
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275 But see id. at 1103.
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decades by force of precedential acceptance.276 But let any court
ask a highly qualified and well-trained financial expert to produce a single peer-reviewed article unrelated to litigation and
not written by a frequent expert witness, where that article concludes a market is inefficient or efficient based on trading volume,
number of analyst reports, the presence of market makers, the
eligibility of filing a Form S-3, or a history of price reactions to
corporate events. No such article will be forthcoming. It does not
exist. It does not exist because those are not reliable tests for
distinguishing efficiency from inefficiency.
The birth and survival of the Cammer factors—so obviously unrelated to the financial economics of market efficiency—
raise the question whether more such phenomena exist where a
junk science that can prosper for decades because the parties to
the litigation have distorted incentives to challenge the unreliable
methodologies that are sometimes helpful for them. This more
general phenomenon deserves study to see if it exists in other areas
of litigation. The effort requires a substantial amount of domain
knowledge on the methodology that is used and a knowledge of the
applicable law, so it is well-suited to study by scholars trained in
law and another discipline. Indeed, such insights ought to be a
major contribution of scholars with such bi-disciplinary training.
For now, however, to borrow from Shakespeare: the next
thing we do, let’s kill all the Cammer factors.277
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